We seek to understand why Thomas Aquinas found it necessary to assimilate Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite as an authority and how this assimilation enabled the composition of a Neoplatonic thought-matrix within an Aristotelian scientific framework. Thus, we aim to formulate a theological science based on the premises of the via remotionis as transcendence, through the epistemological possibility of analogy and metaphor. The incorporation of Dionysius does not appear as an extrinsic or merely devotional element, but as a response to an internal requirement of the Thomistic project itself, which needed conceptual instruments capable of treating separate realities and the Divine Principle according to an epistemological regime adequate to its transcendence. In this sense, we reconstruct the genealogy of the reception of the Corpus Dionysiacum from its origins to its intellectual elevation in the 13th century, showing how the systematic reading undertaken by Albert the Great was decisive in consolidating Dionysius as a philosophical-theological authority and in preparing the horizon upon which Aquinas could operate his own reelaboration.

By confronting Albert the Great’s commentaries on The Divine Names with those of Thomas Aquinas, the properly epistemological questions of theology become visible. While in Albert there is a predominance of the symbolic and hierarchical exposition of Dionysian thought, in Thomas this material is reorganized within a theory of knowledge that articulates operations of the intellect, the centrality of judgment, and the distinction between essence and being (esse). From this configuration, the lineage of the Areopagite’s thought is understood as integrated into a theological science that proceeds through proportional affirmations, without the pretension of a direct apprehension of the Divine essence, but rather of a reintegration with the One as Principle.

Thomas embraced Dionysius holistically, making him the third most cited author in his entire corpus, and his theology was structured also upon celestial hierarchy and negative theology. Based on this reading, we unravel the triplex via to show how, from the impossibility of stating what God is, an affirmative path opens, founded on causality, analogy, participation, and eminence. The via remotionis (way of negation) occupies a decisive structural position, for it establishes the internal limit of every theological affirmation. By removing from God not only imperfections but also the finite modes of signifying inherent to concepts extracted from the sensible, the negative way prevents divine names from being understood according to a univocal or quidditative regime. The apophatic function does not suspend knowledge but prepares it, preserving the ontological difference between the Divine Principle and created beings, and ensuring that every affirmation remains ordered toward the transcendence of the Divine essence. Negation is established as the condition of possibility for affirmative theology, as it delimits the reach of the intellect to the plane of being and causality, opening the space in which analogy, participation, and eminence can ground true judgments without reducing the Absolute to the measure of the human concept.

The via causalitatis (way of causality) grounds theological affirmation by recognizing that the perfections present in created beings proceed from a First Principle that communicates them according to the order of participation. This causal relationship establishes an analogical regime of signification, in which perfections are affirmed of God as the fountal cause and of beings as effects, according to diverse proportions of being. Analogy ensures that divine names possess a real reference to the Principle and express the ontological difference between the simple mode of Divine subsistence and the participated mode of creatures. The via eminentiae (way of eminence) elevates this recognition by affirming that the causally recognized perfections subsist in God in a supereminent manner, according to a degree of being that corresponds to the simplicity and plenitude of the Principle. Thus, causality, analogy, and eminence jointly structure a theological affirmation proportional to the human mode of knowing and ordered toward the intelligibility of the transcendent. The recognition of the limit of language leads not to the suspension of discourse, but to the constitution of a theology proceeding through proportional inferences and symbols.

At the end of Festschrift (1899), Hilbert stated that the purity of the method is a ‘subjective’ requirement. However, in his reconstruction of Euclidean geometry, he adopted two clearly purist requirements: (1) to avoid the use of Archimedes’ axiom in elementary propositions. and (2) to demonstrate geometric versions of the Common Notions. These requirements seek an autonomous foundation for geometry and exclude the use of external notions, such as number or general magnitude. What is the epistemic value of these requirements? Can they be justified in any way, or are they merely idiosyncratic? This is the ‘open problem’ of purity in Hilbert. The thesis argues that its justification is essentially dialogical: it depends on philosophical images about the nature of mathematical knowledge and belongs to the realm of rational choices, not to that of ‘technical’ axiomatic analysis. In doing so, the thesis fills two gaps in the current literature: the normative dimension of purity and the conceptualisation of the relationship between purity and the axiomatic method.

The discussion is structured as follows. First, the epistemic function of purity identifies a problem of foundations for which autonomous foundation constitutes a possible (though not the only) solution. At this level, the purist solution is justified by appealing to an ‘architectural’ image of theories and to the adoption of an elementary point of view in reconstruction. Second, the methodological function of purity guides axiomatic research, inducing specific modes of reconstruction. Here, the axiomatic method can show whether a purist requirement is achievable, thus operating as a tool of methodological criticism that enhances the rational evaluation of these requirements. However, this requires the adoption of an image of formal axiomatic theory according to which it maintains an ‘analogy’ with the elementary facts of geometry; otherwise, purist requirements would be directly meaningless. This analogy constitutes the axiomatic expression of the elementary point of view.

Finally, in the absence of a more precise denomination, the concept of deep justification is introduced, understood as that which appeals to an image of the very nature of mathematics. This image corresponds to the ‘conceptual style’ à la Dedekind and the type of methodological formalism that derives from it. From this perspective, purist demands are justified by the requirement that calculation with geometric magnitudes be a result of theory, rather than a prior constitutive element. From an ex ante point of view, this tripartite division can be understood as a progressive effort to offer increasingly substantive reasons, insofar as they appeal to more basic images of knowledge. In this sense, the conceptual style functions as a kind of ultimate justification for purist demands, while the epistemic function represents an “initial motivation”. However,images of knowledge are also justified ex post, fundamentally for reasons of mathematical fertility linked to the generalisation of methods. In this inverse sense, Hilbert conceived of the conceptual style as responsible for the great mathematical advances of the 19th century, with the axiomatic method being the ‘apex’ of this style. Thus, the axiomatic realisation of the conceptual style introduces an architectural image of theories and an analogy between them and geometric intuition. A reconstruction of this type then satisfies the epistemic function: what is justified is the type of solution adopted. The thesis consequently shows the interaction between ex ante and ex post justifications, as well as their expression in Hilbert’s axiomatic practice.

The present study has as subject the principle of individuation of Duns Scotus’ Metaphysics, aiming to understand what is and how such principle is part of composition of something for generating a unique being. Therefore, it studies the concept of common nature, from which one can understand the principle of individuation. Indeed, a being is not individuated from nothing, but from a common nature, that this same being shares with others beings of the same species.Thus, common nature is the basis in which the individuation occurs. The element that provides such individuation is called haecceity, because it is something unique and unrepeatable. Haecceity is something positive, since it is added to common nature; in view of this, it isn’t something negative, which would be characterized by the absence of something. Neither, haecceity is not a kind of accident or existence, but it is a key and indispensable element for the constitution of an individual being. Furthermore, for a more accurate understanding of this principle of individuation, it’s necessary not only to see the basis (common nature) upon which fall haecceity, but also as common nature and haecceity relate to each other to generate an individual being. The relationship between both elements is characterized by formal distinction, in which there is inseparability of the elements and conceitual independence between them. For all these reasons, to the comprehension of the Scotist principle of individuation, it’s necessary the study of the common nature, which enables the individuation, since it is like a base material to do so; it’s required also to understand the relation between common nature and individuation, in which there is not a process of assimilation or overlap.

This work contributes to Camusian studies by exploring the complexity of metaphysical revolt through the taxonomy of its yes and no, highlighting its ethical, aesthetic, historical and metaphysical aspects. Initially, we analyze the meaning of yes and no as movements intrinsic to revolt and their relationship with the creation of values through the imposition of limits arising from human experience. Then, based on Camus's commentary on Scheler, we distinguish Camusian revolt from resentment: the latter, purely reactive and destructive; the former, articulating a solidary ethics based on reason and sensitivity. At the same time, we advance in the specialized literature by explaining Camus's Hegelian Occidentalism in the historical conception of revolt and, through Deleuzian categories, we demonstrate that Camusian absurdism differs from nihilistic philosophies, proposing to overcome them. To better understand the metaphysics of the theory of revolt, we instrumentally compared Camus’s epistemology with Kantian theory of knowledge and made explicit the distinction between the empirical face of revolt and its metaphysical aspect. We then introduced the concept of “theogonic resentment” to identify the No of metaphysical revolt, characterized by the denial of the absurd and the tension between the rejection of the created world and dependence on divine transcendence. Philosophers and writers such as Epicurus, Lucretius, Sade, Milton, Baudelaire, and Dostoevsky helped us analyze the dangers of misdirected revolts. Finally, we integrated the research by organizing the foundations of Camus' theory of art, present in his youthful essay Art and Communion (1931) and in the ideas presented in his mature essay The Rebel (1951): in this analysis, we verified how the most diverse artistic languages (architecture, music, sculpture, painting, literature and theater) dialogue with the general theory of art as rebellion proposed by Camus. What we highlighted, to highlight the nature of the Yes, is that for Camus art is a metaphysical demand for unity, in which men, rejecting the world as it is, without wishing to escape it, simultaneously exalt and deny reality, highlighting the role of art as a form of affirmation and overcoming of the absurd. Here, artistic creation emerges as a creator of universes where man can reign and effectively know

The object of this research is the philosophical problem related to the production of knowledge by black women and the way in which this production is discredited or silenced. The aim of this research is to analyze, based on Miranda Fricker's theory of epistemic injustice (2023) and Kristie Dotson's theory of epistemic oppression (2011; 2012; 2014), how this exclusion manifests itself in epistemic discussions and in the production of knowledge by these women. For this investigation, we will use black feminist epistemology, based on the works of Patricia Hill Collins (2019) and Sueli Carneiro (2023), to examine how black women are affected as knowers. This analysis leads us to question: (i) which criteria are used to validate knowledge; (ii) who holds the power to establish these criteria; and (iii) which perspectives are privileged and which are marginalized in this process.

This research is driven by two central themes: mathematics and the dialectical method in Theaetetus, investigating how Plato mobilizes mathematical concepts in formulating the fundamental question of the dialogue: What is knowledge (tí estí epistéme;)? Initially, we analyze the history of ancient mathematics to identify the elements that influenced the development of Plato’s dialectical method. This approach adopts a decolonizing perspective, aiming to incorporate new fields of study into ancient philosophy, rethinking the traditional narrative and considering the presence of epistemologies that are not exclusively Hellenic in the formation of Platonic thought. Thus, we explore Egyptian and Greek mathematical traditions and their resonance in Plato’s philosophy. In this context, we examine Plato’s place within this mathematical tradition, his reflections on the science of numbers, and how mathematical problems of the time appear in the structure of the Theaetetus.It is important to note that, in the Theaetetus, mathematics does not appear merely as a field of knowledge but as part of the very structure of philosophical discourse. One example of this relationship is passage 148d, in which Plato describes Theodorus demonstrating geometrically the powers of irrational numbers, such as “those of three and five feet, which are incommensurable, in length, with that of one foot,” until reaching seventeen feet, where he stops. This passage leads us to the following question: How can something that, from a mathematical perspective, cannot be expressed in an integral form—such as irrational numbers—be translated into a unity? Understanding this mathematical context in the work requires at least a minimal grasp of the influence of mathematical traditions that shaped Plato’s understanding of mathematics, considering that the concept of dialectic present in the Theaetetus is closely linked to the mathematical framework of the dialogue.In this sense, this dissertation is structured in three parts: (1) The traditions of mathematical thought; (2) Plato and mathematics; and (3) The composition of the dialectic in the Theaetetus.

In 1926, Virginia Woolf wrote a premonitory essay about a cinema that was still in

its infancy. Inspired by the ideas postulated in this short but significant essay, we are

concerned with questioning: what is cinema’s potential for aesthetic experience? What does

it possess that is expressively its own? What is the relationship between cinema and thought?

Thus, the aim of this study is to carry out an ontological investigation of cinema as a power

of creation and singular expression. Therefore, in order to elucidate the questions that gave

rise to this dissertation, it is necessary to delve deeper into philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s

theories on cinema, emphasizing his divergence from traditional notions of images as

carriers of intrinsic meaning. In this sense, we sought to analyze Deleuze’s distinction

between the movement-image and pure optical-sound images, exemplified here mainly by

Italian neorealism and the French Nouvelle Vague. We realize that, for Deleuze, cinema

creates its own reality, images that become a suis generis world. Thus, in the

cinematographic experience, just as in the real world, the images to which we are exposed

affect each subject in a subjective way, transcending rational limits and directly invoking

the senses and aesthetic appreciation of the viewer. Thus, we start from the Deleuzian

principle that meanings are not pre-defined in the object, but are generated through the

dynamic interaction between the viewer and the image and that the universe resembles

cinema, since everything is an image in perpetual motion. Anchoring the discussion in the

broader context of the impact of art, Deleuze argues that cinema, as an art of vision,

transcends rational thought and provokes an essentially sensual and emotional aesthetic

experience. At its core, this dissertation is a conceptual investigation, proposing that cinema

has the power to affect viewers in profound and unique ways.

This dissertation investigates the possibility of formulating a conception of the moral subject based on the psychoanalytic paradigm. To this end, it begins with a confrontation between the main modern philosophical theories of morality, notably the proposals of Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, and the psychoanalytic models of subjectivation developed by Freud and Lacan. The research argues that the hypothesis of the unconscious, by dismantling the idea of an autonomous and self-transparent subject, imposes new limits and challenges to traditional ethics. At the same time, it seeks to identify whether, and to what extent, psychoanalysis offers viable alternatives for rethinking the moral subject. It concludes that, although psychoanalysis destabilizes the classical foundations of morality, it allows for the elaboration of a new understanding of the ethical subject, less centered on reason and more attentive to subjective division and to the place of desire in the ethical constitution of the subject.

This dissertation examines the thought of Emmanuel Mounier, focusing on the
emergence of personalism as a philosophical response to European nihilism, which was
marked by the humanitarian and moral crises that dominated the first five decades of the
20th century. This period—characterized by world wars, economic crises, and
technological advancements—contributed, according to Mounier, to the degradation of
human dignity. Based on this, the study seeks to understand how Mounier and his
personalism position themselves in the face of this decline, proposing a renewal of
human and communal relations centered on the person and their dignity. Aiming to
highlight the uniqueness of personalism in comparison to other schools of thought of the
time, the research also seeks to show how Mounier criticized nihilism and its
consequences, such as police states, wars, and spiritual alienation, developing
personalism as an active alternative to confront these crises. Thus, the overall goal of
this research is to examine the humanitarian fragility identified by Mounier at the
beginning of the 20th century—a period already influenced by conflicts and
transformations since the previous century. Personalism is presented as a philosophical
response to these crises, offering an alternative in the face of the challenges of the era.
Furthermore, the research will explore the philosophical structure of personalism,
encompassing its anthropology and political philosophy. The study has three specific
objectives: (i) to analyze the historical context of the early 20th-century crises and their
impact on human relations from Mounier's perspective; (ii) to investigate how
personalism can restore human dignity and promote communal coexistence; and (iii) to
explore the influences and distinctiveness of Mounier’s personalism, culminating in the
proposal developed throughout its formulation. Finally, the methodology adopted is
bibliographical and exploratory, with critical analysis of the works of Mounier and other
thinkers, contextualizing the development of their ideas amidst the sociopolitical and
humanitarian crises of the 20th century.

This dissertation deals with the epistemic divergences within the enactivist research program for the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. To do that, we start with a focus on the comparison between the Autonomist and Radical brands of Enactivism regarding how they understand cognitive agency. In Chapter I, the relationship between Cognitivism and Enactivism is explored, making explicit the foundational concepts of this program. While cognitivists proposed to explain cognition through a representational model centered on the agent's internal structures, enactivists assume that the characteristic locus of cognition is not internal but expresses the inseparable interaction between agents' bodies and the environment. Furthermore, we seek to understand how this principle relates to the notions of autopoiesis and sense-making. Following the argument built from the Autonomist brand,
we explore how such notions are taken as a consequence of the idea of embodiment and, therefore, indispensable to Enactivism. Based on this discussion, Chapter II addresses the critique made by Radical Enactivism against the Autonomists, centered on the so-called “hard problem of content”. This debate exposes the divergences between those two brands, based on how they conceive the relationship between cognition, in a broad sense, and human cognitive agency, in particular. Finally, Chapter III proposes an interpretation that promotes a theoretical
complementarity between Radical and Autonomist Enactivism, emphasizing how both their arguments for explaining cognitive agency relate to the notions of intentionality and biological autonomy.

This dissertation examines Walter Benjamin’s concept of the loss of aura as an aesthetic and cultural phenomenon resulting from the technological reproducibility of the artwork. Taking the essay The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1935–1939) as its central axis, the study analyses how technical processes of production and reproduction transform aesthetic experience and become historically consolidated in modernity. The argument then moves back to Benjamin’s reflections on the urban experience of the masses and metropolitan shock, before returning to the context of the historical avant-gardes and photography, where the destruction of aura gives rise to new perceptual and creative regimes. In cinema, the phenomenon reaches its most radical expression: technique ceases to serve cult value and assumes an emancipatory function, instituting a tactile and collective mode of perception. By distinguishing a first, ritualistic technique from a second, liberating technique, Benjamin outlines the possibility of a politicised art capable of training human senses to meet the demands of modern life.

This thesis investigates the place and function occupied by the novel Nausea in the philosophical context of the 1930s in Sartrean thought. To this end, we initially address the specificities of the relationship between philosophy and literature in Sartre, as well as his notion of “creative unity”. Then, when we analyze the subjectivity of philosophical construction and the existential phenomenology project, we note that when Sartre criticizes Husserl's conception of the ego, the motivations and justification of Epoché, he realizes that this suspension is not an intellectual method, but an anguish, this leads us to elucidate an internal need of Sartre's philosophy in relation to literature, which is to understand human reality in its ambiguity and contingency, since they are not reducible to philosophical conceptual expression. Finally, by examining the novel Nausea considering the philosophical background and literary problems belonging to the Sartrian phenomenological-existential construction, we explain that the novel function is the literary idealism deconstruction in face of the bourgeois spirit, as well as the subject idea, and that the place occupied by the novel in Sartrian creative unit is a double of Sketch for a Theory of Emotions.

The present thesis seeks to analyze the realization of a practice of freedom in the present day, namely: the act of raising one's voice, presented by bell hooks, which resembles parrésia as a practice, based on the interpretation that Foucault develops of parrésia in Antiquity, especially the cynical aspect, in terms of resisting governability through truth. This resistance occurs through mechanisms and procedures aimed at guiding individuals, that is, through modes of opposition to behavioral direction. In effect, raising one's voice and speaking freely constitutes a practice of freedom in the face of the exercise of modern power, which manifests in truth discourses and produces subjugation. This power is exercised in the form of governance, that is, it is through it that behaviors are controlled. However, it is also in this context that the possibility of resistance to this governance emerges, which limits us, interpellates us, and dictates how we should or should not act. Governance that shapes itself within the raciality device, coined by Sueli Carneiro, and seeks to enhance the status quo of groups that oppress and undermine struggles involving gender, race, and class. Thus, we will take as a theme for analysis the courage to speak freely as a strategy of resistance, considering it a process of transformation that allows the individual to turn the tables and subvert truth discourses, as well as the pursuit of an ethics that renews itself and aids in the creation of other ways of selfconstruction in both individual and collective spheres. It is a practice in which the individual encounters a field of action possibilities, resisting and subverting through free speech. Our hypothesis, therefore, is that parrésia can be understood as a confrontation, a discomfort directed at individuals and groups that occupy the position of oppressors. In contemporary times, this practice can be associated with what bell hooks termed "raising one's voice": the courage to speak freely and confront the modes of domination that reduce us to the condition of submission and subjugation.

In order to resolve the conflicts of reason with itself, conflicts that manifest in the contradictions (Widersprüche) of metaphysical castles, Kant undertakes a self-analysis of reason to determine what it can or cannot know independently of the senses and experience. As a result of this self-analysis, he concludes that human reason can only know a priori the form of knowledge, that is, its peculiar way of knowing objects. This leads to a new way of conceiving the real world, as human beings cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only things as they appear (als Erscheinungen), thus modified by the human way of knowing. Although this new way of conceiving the real world fully expresses Transcendental Idealism, the fundamental thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason, it seems to rest on another real world that does not appear but is presupposed as the guarantor of phenomenal reality: the world of things in themselves (Ding an sich selbst). However, as presupposing the reality of things in themselves means both engaging in Transcendental Realism (transzendentaler Realismus) and resurrecting the conflicts of reason, Kant, in the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique (1781), argues that the reality of external objects can be testified by mere consciousness (immediate perception), since human beings do not deal with things in themselves but only with phenomena. As, from this perspective, it is not necessary to leave mere consciousness (bloßen Selbstbewußtsein) to prove the reality of external phenomena (KrV, A370; A375), critics of Transcendental Idealism (transzendentalen Idealismus) saw in this thesis a striking similarity between this idealism and Berkeleyan idealism, from which they accused Kant’s philosophy of being solipsistic. In response, Kant, in the Refutation of Idealism, a text included in the second edition of the Critique (1787), states that the empirical determination of existence (internal experience) presupposes something permanent (Beharrliche) external (which is not a representation) as its condition of possibility. From this, he concludes that “the consciousness of my own existence is, simultaneously, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things exterior to me (anderer Dinge außer mir)” (KrV, B276). Considering this manifest oscillation between defending the external real world now as being constituted exclusively by phenomena (Fourth Paralogism of 1781), now as presupposing things in themselves (Refutation of Idealism), and thus also implying the existence of an external world constituted by things in themselves, the present thesis aims to highlight a conflicting conceptual structure at the core of Transcendental Philosophy (Transzendentalphilosophie) that prevents it from effectively determining the existence of a world of real external objects. This implies concluding that Kant’s theoretical philosophy inevitably and involuntarily leads to skepticism, as it does not allow for a secure judgment about truly external real objects.

This thesis seeks to defend, through a proposed periodization, the hypothesis of a
substantial inflection (or Kehre) in Emil Cioran's philosophy. Scholarship on Cioran's
philosophy frequently relies on dividing his work into phases, justified primarily by the
shift in the languages the author employed throughout his life—his first five works were
written in his native Romanian, while the subsequent ten were expressed in French.
Additionally, biographical or, at best, stylistic reasons are often cited, yet from a
philosophical standpoint, these fail to provide a solid basis for concluding that there is a
discontinuity in his thought. At the core of this fragile periodization lies, therefore, a
significant hermeneutic insufficiency, evidenced by the difficulty specialists face in
discerning within his philosophy either its core theoretical elements or its overarching,
most prominent tendencies. Despite the challenge posed by Cioran himself—who, even
while engaging with metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, attacked the "formalism" and
impersonality of philosophy (especially academic philosophy)—we argue that his ideas,
at different times, formed distinct philosophical projects, structured in a manner
consciously divergent from doctrine and system, termed here "philosophical programs."
Building on this framework, we explore the recurring conceptual structures throughout
Cioran's oeuvre and identify, for the first time, his early and mature projects, guided
respectively by the ideas of "transfiguration" and "the fall." It is therefore through
identifying this fundamental discontinuity, represented by two irreducible (and mutually
opposing) programs, that we support the hypothesis of a Kehre in Cioran's philosophy
and, consequently, the existence of two distinct philosophical periods in his work. Our
study thus offers both a general overview of Cioran's thought in its key expressions and
establishes an interpretive paradigm intended to aid future research.

The objective of this work is to understand how the uniqueness of the individual is conceived. Since the light of consciousness turned on, the human species has been compelled to deal with the dilemma between nature and culture. There are those who defend the idea that we are completely cultural, and the question that arises from this perspective is whether the individual does not have innate characteristics of their own. Based on Nietzsche's proposal to become what one is and Jung's concept of individuation, we seek answers to these questions and evaluate how much of Nietzsche Jung brings into the psychic system of his analytical psychology. The conquest of oneself is an object of study for both thinkers and based on this prerogative we will analyze their similarities and divergences. The Nietzschean Will to Power underlies all manifestations of reality and the Jungian Archetypes would be the equivalent of the structure that models these manifestations. Understanding the relationship between the Will to Power and the Archetypes is one of the crucial points of this research. These two concepts will serve as a basis for investigating what the individual of the human species brings with it as collective and individual characteristics.

This dissertation aims to analyze the relationship between otherness and subjectivity through a comparison of the essays and novels of Simone de Beauvoir. Focusing on the role of childhood in the formation of the individual and its influence on otherness, this work seeks to highlight the significance of Beauvoir's philosophical contributions beyond gender discussions, aligning them with both existentialist and phenomenological inquiries. Additionally, the study particularly concentrates on two crucial aspects of the philosopher's works: literature as a means of philosophical expression and violence as a component of intersubjective relations. It is noteworthy in this context that Beauvoir's philosophical exploration is enriched by her distinctive perspective on violence, examining its role in human relationships. By exploring selected novels, especially "She Came to Stay", the study examines how Beauvoir uses literary expression to deepen her investigation into the proposed themes. The subtitle of the dissertation refers to a phrase used by Beauvoir in "Pyrrhus and Cineas" to assert the paradox between perceiving oneself as a free being while simultaneously experiencing the facticity of one's human condition.

The proposition, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is the propositional sign in a projective relationship with the world. This type of articulation, in effect, must ensure that the same logical status prospers between false and true propositions. But how does one anchor a false proposition if the world, according to the Tractatus, is all that is the case? The work intends to discuss the postulation of simple objects as an internal requirement for the harmony between world and language, as well as the determination of the propositional meaning independently of its truth value. Objects are, then, fixed and immutable, only their configurations with other objects, imposed by logical form, vary. The result of this is that the requirement for the simple has as its counterpart its indistinguishability in relation to other objects, as Wittgenstein himself admits in aphorism 2.0233, under penalty of making the figuration of the world unfeasible. Thus, the work also seeks to explore the consequences of the pictorial theory of figuration based on the ontology present in the Tractatus, in how logical atomism is compatible with the harmony between world and language. The result is that objects can only be distinguished by describing their external properties, that is, as poles of coordination with other objects. Defined as simple, on the other hand, the object itself is ineffable. Thus, the ability of language to be able to draw a figuration of the world includes conditions, which are ineffable, that cannot themselves be objects of description of language itself, as is the case with naming and the isomorphy between world and language present in pictorial theory. 

Investigating the notion of “being-in” (In-Sein) in the work Being and Time, by Martin Heidegger, and analyzing the relationship of this with anguish (Angst) and healing (Sorge) is the objective of this study. do, which is based on the premise that the internal articulation between these concepts is crucial for a cohesive understanding of human existence in Heideggerian philosophy. Being-in is presented as a central concept for the structure of presence (Dasein) by highlighting that the human being is always immersed in an existential context, in constant relationship with the world. Our discussion is organized around three main pillars: the understanding of human existence as being-in, the analysis of anguish as a disposition revealing the true existential condition and the investigation of healing as a structural totality of presence. Anxiety is highlighted as a fundamental disposition that awakens presence to its most unique possibilities of being, while healing is analyzed as an ontological phenomenon that unifies the constitutive elements of presence, giving them a cohesion that transcends mere sum of parts. The dissertation concludes that being-in is fundamental to understanding anguish and healing in Heidegger and allows a deeper interpretation of presence and its relationship with the world, finitude and death.

Seeking a more global as well as historical and philosophically situated understanding of the
thought of the German philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt, this thesis investigates
the paths through which the author undertakes in her work, in a consistent movement of critical
appropriation of the central theses that shape the contemporary philosophical traditions that
helped in making of her a thinker, a philosophical turn of great ontological consequences. We

have, therefore, as a general objective, to make explicit how Arendt, starting from the contem-
porary intersection between the phenomenological, existentialist and hermeneutic traditions,

conceives a fundamentally political ontology, inserting the category of plurality, central to her
thought, within philosophical thinking, so as to implode its traditional foundations. More than
a regional ontology of the political dimension of human existence, what Hannah Arendt puts

forward is a philosophy based on a notion of Being always constituted from plurality as a fun-
damental ontological condition of human existence. In this sense, we will try, from the outset,

to find the ontological and methodological core of Arendt's thought in its relationship with the

thought of authors such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers and Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty, among others. Starting, then, from such a radical theoretical contextualization, we

will seek, centrally, first, to conceive the properly Arendtian way of phenomenologically des-
cribing the world that, in its daily actualization, human existence, so to speak, opens up for

itself. From there, taking as a touchstone the important Arendtian distinction between truth and
meaning, we will propose a systematizing interpretation of the core of Arendtian ontology
around the understanding of the structural articulations of the phenomenal world and the human
dynamics of meaning donation. Finally, an effort will be made to understand and bring to light,
in an indicative way, the deep relationships between this radically philosophical-ontological
scenario and the more well-known and widely studied, although with often divergent results,

thema of Arendtian political thought. In this process, will emerge the contours of a philosophi-
cal normativity, present in Arendt's thought will, that points to an understanding of democracy

as an ontologically grounded imperative of human existence.

The connections between Cavell's philosophy of ordinary language (FLO) and the themes of skepticism, the possibility of attributing meaning to language and self-knowledge are ways of thinking about the conditions for expressing situations of the mind (plight of mind) and the circumstances that allow an individual to communicate a specific human condition. In this sense, the most common and natural uses of ordinary language reveal a starting point for claiming the mutual recognition of actions and words, without, however, guaranteeing the intelligible presentation of a subjective voice. In Cavell's FLO, the epistemic status of the wittgensteinian notion of criterion implies a view of the relations between individuals, and between them and the world, based on a critique of the skeptical claim for indubitable knowledge. According to Cavell, these possibilities of bonding depend on an acceptance of the fragile nature of the agreements in judgments that establish the criteria for meaningful uses of language, as well as on an attitude of recognition that seeks an intelligible approximation in relation to the other. Cavell understands skepticism as a repudiation of language that results in tragic consequences due to the death of the capacity for recognition. His approach to modern skepticism establishes a link between his FLO and self-knowledge based on a claim for the recognition of subjective expressions as a way of communicating a specific human condition. In this thesis, I try to approach these themes from interlocutions between Cavell, Kripke, Descartes, Shakespeare and Wittgenstein, in order to suggest FLO as an activity of clarification of the conditions of mutuality, in other words, the conditions for effective intersubjective communication and self-knowledge.

This thesis analyzes how Gaston Bachelard received and interpreted the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, highlighting the Neo-Kantian aspect that permeates his applied rationalism. Bachelard, influenced by French Neo-Kantianism, recognized that Kantian ideas could not be directly applied to the interpretation of quantum mechanics—a science that established an epistemological rupture with the precepts of classical physics and challenged the fundamental principles of Kantianism. However, Bachelard realized that Kantian principles still offered a fruitful alternative for addressing the challenges of this new science. He thus proposed a non-Kantianism or open Kantianism, representing a philosophy inspired by Kant's transcendental perspective but adapted to the contemporary scientific context. This new philosophy, constituting a new rationalism, results from a project of flexibilization, expansion, and dynamization of Kantian categories, in opposition to the conception of an absolute and immutable reason defended by Kant. Bachelard incorporates the Kantian notion of the positive noumenon to explain the objectification of the quantum object, which he considers an object of mathematical thought realized in technical experimentation. This presupposes not only a new model of schematism, elaborated by Bachelard through an analogy with transcendental schematism, but also an update of synthetic a priori judgments, thus preserving the transcendental perspective.

In this text, I discuss the following question: What is understanding? I consider the main arguments in the literature and defend a specific conception of understanding, according to which understanding involves grasping correct explanations. To this end, I initially discuss the relationship between knowledge and understanding. I evaluate in what sense understanding differs or does not differ from knowledge. I assess proposals according to which understanding would be distinct from knowledge, as well as those that characterize understanding as a type of knowledge. Subsequently, I consider the relationship between understanding and explanation. I present some elementary aspects of the concept of explanation, and how it normally involves the apprehension of dependency relations. Subsequently, I present the conception of understanding that I consider most plausible. I maintain that there is understanding when we grasp correct explanations. Next, I evaluate the notion of apprehension. In the literature on understanding, this term appears frequently, usually linked to conscious transparency. I will argue that understanding does not involve conscious transparency or any second-order state. To this end, I present some data in cognitive science that demonstrate the opacity of the mind, that is, that we have very limited access to our mental states, so that cognitive success, expressed in terms of knowledge or understanding, does not involve this conscious transparency. In the last chapter, I discuss the relationship between understanding and truth. I discuss an argument in favor of a non-factive conception of understanding to evaluate the main points on this issue. After characterizing this argument, I argue that several responses are available to the veritist. First, one can defend a non-factive conception of understanding while maintaining compatibility with veritism. Another way to maintain veritism is to admit a more liberal notion of representation. Finally, it can be maintained that only those aspects that make a difference are considered in a correct explanation, thus maintaining the thesis that understanding is a factive notion, that is, it requires truth as a necessary condition. I argue that this last option is the most plausible.

Our thesis is that, based on the thoughts of Jean-Paul Sartre, conflicts in the struggle for recognition of other human beings are not a means to an end, that is, there is no reconciliation or symmetry in this struggle. On the contrary, it is through the continuation of a permanent conflict that we can speak of recognition, even if it is not symmetrical. This is our general position in this research, while our specific position is reflected in the understanding that recognition should always be asymmetric or dissymmetric rather than something symmetric. For us, reciprocal recognition must occur in an asymmetrical way, otherwise in a relationship with another there would be no recognition of the existence of that other as alterity. Our position is that although many see reciprocity in recognition as necessitating symmetry, our thesis argues that recognition can exist without symmetry. This is the essence of our argument. So how can Sartre's social philosophy contribute to contemporary debates about recognition? We will try to answer this question. Honneth, one of the main people responsible for the contemporary renewal of recognition theory, claimed to have identified Sartre as the most important of post-World War II French writers. However, he also professes to overcome Sartrean limitations: on the one hand, Sartre offers a partial view of the concept of recognition, seeing the other as a reification; on the other hand, Honneth argues that his theory addresses the topic more comprehensively. Given this, we will explore how Honneth's critique of Sartre's thought can highlight Sartre's continued relevance for a theory of recognition. We will use Sartre's work as a basis for analyzing Sartre's interpretation of Honneth, thus demonstrating Sartre's lasting importance in this field. The research will begin with a report on Honneth's proposal and his interpretative reading of Sartre, in order to emphasize the way in which this interpretation intersects and differs from the approach to recognition that Sartre derives from his phenomenological ontology. We do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of the pros and cons of Honneth's critique of Sartre. Our aim is rather to show that our own interpretation of Sartre's philosophy can pave the way for exploring ideas that could improve current debates about recognition.

This dissertation addresses Angela Davis' critique of “freedom,” focusing on a crucial problem she identifies: Freedom for Black men and women is limited, for it does not exist as a lived reality. Taking up this assertation, this project aims to investigate the mechanisms that capitalist systems utilize to limit the freedom of racialized groups. First, it examines how racialized peoples construct their own ethical-political relations when their freedom is  hindered by the invention of race and otherness. Second, it examines the conditions through which these people, who are objectified and marked by difference, can be recognised as rational subjects with desires and, above all, rights. This project demonstrates that “freedom qua the pillar of democracy,” a discourse used by neoliberal states, holds a contradiction. This contradiction is evident in the staggering number of human beings that are incarcerated daily. Capitalist democratic governments, motived by financial gain, use the fallacy of the “War on Drugs” to this end. These governments depend on racial oppression and limit the rights of some groups of people to secure the rights of others. The prison system transforms into a punishment industry that uses racism and xenophobia to supply prisons, disproportionately incarcerating Black people. Here, torture practices are used for bodily coercion and docility, although bodily torture is not generally permitted within these democratic insitutions. Still, women of color live through and resist these conditions. Black women in particular present abolitionist alternatives, allowing an understanding of other ethical-political possibilities. She has always been active in all emancipatory movements; she led marches against the lynchings of black men; she used, and uses, art to reveal pain, strength and the struggle to overcome. Because she is at the base of most hierarchies of oppressions, the task of freeing herself from subjugation and violence falls on her body. Her freedom is therefore freedom for others.

This dissertation has as a purpose to examine the hypothesis according to the destabilization of the subject of identity presented by the philosopher Judith Butler could provide fundamental openings or cracks to an radical action and discourse, exceeding the politics of identity. The critic of the gender subject, fundamental to the identity politics of feminism, provoque a debate based on the category of “Women”. Butler refutes gender identity in its metaphysical sense and proposes an approach of it as an performative notion. Her thought, however, takes a normative turn from the 2000’s on, which makes her deepen the concept of performative identity under an ethical approach. In this way, the philosopher proposes as a foundation of life’s value and its exposition the precarious condition of life. Bearing in mind the grounding of life's value and its exposition to the precariousness, Butler goes beyond her performative gender theory, proposing a theory of collective and plural performativity, thinking bodies gathered together in assembly. Thus, this work has as structure the discussion of the history of the subject of law and his development in modern political theory, and then to starts an investigation about the category of subject in contemporaneity. Thereafter, it discusses, too, the critique of the gender ontology of Beauvoir, followed by the elaboration of performative identity of gender. And finally this dissertation is ended by the reflection of the normative turn of Butler’s work, from the concepts of grief and precariousness, and how these concepts could help (or not) to think a convergence point to the contemporary struggles that transcends the identity subject.

The human reason is divided into three kinds: the first from knowledge, the second from
probabilities, and the third from proofs. The first one arrives from comparison of ideas and it is
not subject to the experience’s scrutiny. The other two kinds of reasoning are formed by matter
of facts, whose argumments are based on causes and effects, and any evidency of their
jugdments must appeal to experience. The reasonings from knowlegde, or demonstrative
reasonings, are justified by reason and its propositions are intuitively certain. The reasonings
from probabilities, or probable reasonings, it does not has the same sucess. Based on
probabilities, they consider the chances that the same object has to provide the same result. Due
the lack of evidence and for not beying able to intuitively demonstrate their judgments, they
can only judge about the conjectures of existence. As I will argue throughout this dissertation,
probable reasonings are incapable of justifying their arguments. Consequently, the hypothesis
that I will assume is that the reasonings from proofs is the only way to justify causality
arguments. Therefore, I will first examine Hume’s theory of perception, in order to show
knowlegde’s structure and the nature of impressions and ideas that conceive the reasonings.
This inicial exam will serve to, posteriorly, examine the foundations of causal reasoning. As
such, in a second moment, I will examine Hume’s arguments about the principles of human
nature that associate perceptions on the imagination. I will then argue that this principles, when
recognized as proofs, explain all the logic employed in causal reasoning, and thus justify
arguments from causality.

The question to which this research aims to provide a coherent and adequate answer to the Nietzschean philosophical project can be formulated as follows: what does the new requirement announced by Nietzsche in the prologue to the Genealogy of morals mean, according to which “we need a critique of moral values, that the value of values itself must be called into question?” (GM/GM §6). In this paper, we argue that genealogy is configured as a regressive investigation into the origins of values, which is opposed to the search for metaphysical "essences" and ahistorical truths and is closely identified with a notion of process. We understand that this mode of investigation is typical of a philosophy of interpretation that uses genealogical- naturalistic tools and seeks to replace the problem of truth with the problem of value. We will analyze the concept of historical meaning as an anthropological interpretation, that is, as an instrument of evaluation that occupies an important place within the naturalist program of the Genealogy of morals. In addition, we will highlight the idea that the Nietzschean program does not ignore the scientific discoveries of the intellectual milieu in which the philosopher is inserted. Although we understand that Nietzsche does not propose reducing philosophical reflection to a scientific view of reality, we understand that philosophical activity is enriched by a diversified view, including an honest approach to dialog with the natural sciences. The scope of the research that follows consists of studying genealogy as a procedure that puts values into question, when it asks what value values have. As a result, the main theses of the Genealogy of morals will be discussed, i.e. the inversion of values, the psychology of resentment, bad conscience and the critique of the ascetic ideal, in parallel with the concept of the transvaluation of all values.

This is a thesis that follows the path indicated by Mario Vegetti, in understanding the figure of the political Plato in relation to the ideological issues that influence the interpretation of Plato's own texts, mainly using three dialogues: The Republic, The Laws, and The Statesman. Due to this critical approach, the first part provides a brief overview of the main arguments criticized since antiquity, from Aristophanes' comedy and Aristotle's refutation to Neoplatonism and the Byzantine period, but jumping straight to the 20th century and the Cold War, which contributed to the formation of biased readings based on the political thought of commentators such as Karl Popper and Leo Strauss. I also highlight the themes of Ancient History that were influenced by Karl Marx's philosophy, particularly the concept of social class employed in ancient societies.

Therefore, it is an exploratory research that follows a thematic axis of analysis, based on topics that still pique our contemporary curiosity, which are interdependent and intertwined at various points, aiming to better understand the main aspects of political issues in Plato. The discussion thus covers various subjects, such as the manifestation of power through persuasive discourse or necessary coercion through violence; the legitimacy of authority and the role of guardians and lawmakers; ideology and models of the city, ranging from the paradigm of the Callipolis to Magnesia; criticism of democracy in relation to emotions and the parallel between the soul and the city; Greek colonization and its influence on the development of a normative utopia for the foundation of future societies where justice would be better distributed; gender equality and the abolition of the traditional family model; criticism of property and the communism of goods; and finally, slavery and the disdain for manual labor.

As a consequence, the theoretical distinctive feature of this work lies in the historical contextualization carried out in addressing Platonic Political Philosophy. This approach ensures an understanding of Plato within the limits of his time, without falling into shallow anachronism or idealizing the author. It highlights the shared experience among Greek authors of the classical period in relation to the temporal frame of reference they possessed.

This thesis aims to present the debate on the nature of Euclidean geometric demonstrations
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. It starts by examining the reception of the Platonic
philosopher Proclus' comments on Euclid's Elements and the tradition of demonstrative
science presented in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics . At the heart of this debate is a dispute
about the relevance of certain rhetorical concepts in light of the alleged limitations of
syllogistics in accounting for how mathematicians typically demonstrate their propositions.
The mathematical practice inferred from the Elements allows for a coordination between two
types of justifications, one provided by linguistic means and the other by diagrams, primarily
but not exclusively aimed at solving geometric problems. The establishment of a
logical-linguistic definition of demonstration, heavily influenced by David Hilbert, resulted in
the dispensability of diagrams. The axiomatizations of what was understood as Euclidean
geometry in the 16th and 17th centuries, for the most part, were embedded in Aristotle's
doctrine of demonstrative science. From this perspective, the tradition of problem-solving is
secondary. Nevertheless, Aristotle believed that demonstrations should satisfy both logical
and epistemological criteria in equal measure. Unlike 20th-century philosophy of
mathematics, Aristotle's conception of demonstration was not solely concerned with logical
consequence. However, the syllogistic reconstruction of Euclidean demonstrations was not the
primary goal, especially since Proclus raised doubts about the power of Aristotelian logic.
The crisis of the Aristotelian scientific method paved the way for the exploration of
alternative approaches, including rhetoric. Most commentators on the Euclidean text during
this period assumed that the demonstrations in the Elements were intentionally abbreviated,
allowing them to speak of enthymemes, i.e. , rhetorical syllogisms. The inclusion of new
axioms not covered in Proclus' text, many of which anticipated Hilbert's formal axiomatic
method, makes it possible to restore the complete version of the demonstration without
implying that the abbreviated version, i.e. , enthymematic, is considered illegitimate.

In this work, I discuss the nature of propositional ignorance, the possibility of non-factive ignorance and the applicability of this analysis to some topics of analytic epistemology. My intention is, first, to present a critical introduction to the discussion between two relevant alternatives that dispute the definition of ignorance, namely, the Standard View and the New View. For the former, ignorance is the absence of knowledge; for the second, the absence of true belief. Considering this divergence, each of these alternatives will be exposed given how they define ignorance and the specific conditions for propositional ignorance. Furthermore, both conceptions of propositional ignorance will be briefly contrasted based on some topics present in the current debate. Second, I intend to point out that, unlike how these conceptions of ignorance are presupposed, propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. Reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P", these views do not make the best analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of non-factive ignorance and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theorical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will point to a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of non-factive ignorance and overcoming the objections raised against them. In addition, finally, this reformulated analysis of propositional ignorance will be applied to some relevant topics of analytic epistemology that are essentially relate to ignorance, but which have not been sufficiently debated in this relationship to ignorance, namely, education, suspension of judgment and investigation. In this application, I will be aiming at a clarification of these relationships and showing that there are other ways to point out the adequacy of this reformulation. Thus, this work aims to contribute to the dissemination in Portuguese of a recent but growing discussion in analytical epistemology, as well as to the theoretical development in this area.

This dissertation does not aim to define virtue (areté), but to examine how Plato understands an investigation that has as its starting point a hypóthesis similar to those used by geometers. Although virtue is a problematized theme - even if indirectly - in practically the entire Corpus Platonicum, it will be thematized, in this research, having as its primary basis the dialogue Meno, more precisely, from the excerpt 86c - when the homonymous character to the dialogue gives up trying to define virtue and returns to its first question - namely, whether virtue can be taught. As the investigation into virtue now has a hypóthesis as its starting point, we will, beforehand, seek to understand what Plato thinks about the term hypótheses. Furthermore, considering that the dialogue, based on the assumption that virtue can be encompassed by episteme, provisionally concludes that phrónesis is virtue, we will examine the relationship between the terms epistéme and phrónesis. In a second moment, as there is an unfolding in the conclusion of the Meno, since virtue starts to be investigated from the empirical question and is considered as orthè dóxa, we will analyze the similarity between orthè dóxa and hypóthesis. In this way, we will see to what extent the investigation of virtue from a hypóthesis influences the outcome of the Meno. 

L’objectif principal de cette thèse est celui de mettre à jour le débat philosophique autour de la relation entre l’anthropologie et la pédagogie, en mettant en évidence la formulation rousseauienne de l’homme à l’état de nature, a travers la comparaison avec l’éducation des enfants, plus précisément, avec le concept pédagogique de l’œuvre rousseauienne Émile, ou De l'éducation. La coupure de recherche ramène au modèle classique d’éducation humaine proposé par Platon, pour constater qu’il a inspiré des philosophes qui ont proposé de penser l’éducation de l’individu dans la modernité, a savoir : Montaigne, Comenius, Locke et Rousseau lui-même. Le philosophe Genevois propose dans l’oeuvre Émile un ensemble de principes qui composent sa pédagogie imprégnée par l’anthropologie, en mettant l’accent sur des questions telles que : qu’est-ce que l’homme et comment son éducation devrait-elle être? Ces questions sont posées devant une science anthropologique encore tâtonnante, qui se développe depuis la Renaissance pour atteindre son apogée au XVIIIe siècle, avec les Lumières françaises. Les idées de Rousseau provoquent dans cette science une fissure jamais imaginée pour la période.  Basé sur l’idée d’anthropologie fictive, on utilise le mythe de Glauco et se rend dans les origines de l’homme, qu’on reprend pour les employer dans l’enfant fictif, dans lequel se déroule un nouveau paradigme de la formation humaine. En traitant de l’enfance jusqu’à l’âge de douze ans, on montre les moyens de la préserver et de la protéger, pour le bien d’eux-mêmes, afin d’éviter des vices et des erreurs qui conduisent à la corruption et au malheur, à travers le travail du précepteur. Dans la ferveur du XVIIIe siècle, les sciences humaines sont influencées par la physique newtonienne, permettant d’envisager Emile comme une expérience humaine en éducation, dont la nature fournit les principes à suivre par le précepteur et pour que son élève soit soumis aux expériences d’exercice du corps et d’amélioration des sens, à travers les préceptes et les principes qui permettront de gérer l’éducation négative. Si Rousseau identifie les caractéristiques de l’enfant aux mêmes particularités de l’homme à l’état de nature, il est évident que sa conception de la pédagogie est étroitement liée à l’anthropologie, et que son idéalisation d’Emile s’intègre à la compréhension de la condition originelle de l’humanité. S’appuyant sur sa pédagogie centrée sur l’anthropologie, Rousseau cherche à développer des principes pouvant garantir ou éviter au maximum la dégénérescence et la défiguration de l’homme, a travers un processus capable de conduire les enfants à devenir des hommes autonomes face aux incitations négatives présentées par le processus social. Un homme aussi bien formé aura toutes les capacités et les conditions pour être souverain, libre et juste. Par conséquent, il formera une société plus juste et égalitaire, où les gens seront plus heureux. Selon Rousseau, penser l’enfant c’est concevoir l’homme futur.

In some movies it seems like nothing happens. This conflict with mass cinema is a deliberate effort by filmmakers to achieve the imponderable of what haunts their characters and the world created. The imponderable is not within the reach of the figurative, otherwise it would no longer be endowed with its characteristic of ineffability. Thus, “nothing happens” is a stylistic choice of emptying for the amplification of the aesthetic senses of the film. The film perceives a world beyond its first sensory layer. The emptying we are talking about refers to Bergson’s nothingness, who understood that there was more to the idea of emptiness than to the idea of existence, since the first includes the second plus its negation. However, the stylistic choice for emptying goes beyond suggestibility: it establishes the presence of that imponderability impossible to be figured. The stylistic emptying then makes an ideological cut, presenting ineffable ideas that do not belong to analytical understanding, but to intuition. The latter is the field of cinematographic affection, the cosmos-creating machine that not only perceives but also feels the mishaps of the new world. These ideas are made present in this absolute immediacy, that is, in this immediacy that brings together the past and the present in a future that is being built. The absolute is the vital sap of a changing duration while it lives, released into its freedom. We conclude that the sublime is the feeling of presence of the imponderable idea, which is absolute.

This essay aims to analyze the condemnation of man to freedom defended by J-P Sartre in Being and Nothingness, to maintain that freedom deliberately dehumanizes human people. And, we assume that such condemnation becomes a problem, therefore, the priority of freedom seems to delegates man to care only about the formation of his values and with their release from the bonds of society. So, the man does not realizes that he is transforming human people into objects to satisfy his personal desires. Therefore, we question whether the priority of the man's freedom would be carry out their liberation or dehumanize people.

The difficulties of the contemporary philosophical debate in dealing with specifically moral problems, as they are enunciated by the obstacles of individuation developed by the new social relations, in addition to the opportunistic use of morality by neofascism, go back to the diagnosis of the hungarian philosopher György Lukács about the need for the constitution of a tertium datur for the reduction of ethics to the alternatives of relativistic historicism and metaphysical dogmatism. Imbued with such perspective, the marxist philosopher projected an ambitious theoretical itinerary around the understanding of morality, combining historicity and social objectivity. The death of the author, however, bequeathed to posterity only the background work for further ethical reflection, an ontology of the social being, and the notes organized by the philosopher to guide his own writing. The aim of this study is to compare these remaining texts, so that Lukács' contribution to the understanding of the social genesis of moral value can be systematized. For that, the reconstruction of his thinking starts from the conditions of human self-production, which consolidate the use value as the first form of valuation, following his mediation with the development of sociality that provides bases for the formation of moral value and, finally, the problems related to the historical and objective development of morality and the discontinuities of its appropriation by social individuals. Thus, we intend to systematize the status that Lukács gives to moral value, through its social genesis, placing it in the complex of complexes of human action.

This dissertation aims to expose how Thomas Aquinas qualifies the causal relationship between sensible knowledge, specifically ghosts, and the intellectual activity now expressed in the concept of materia causae. In the Summa Theologiae, question 84, article 6, Aquinas admits the concept of materia causae in opposition to the notion of total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge as a way of safeguarding the maxim that a corporeal thing cannot act on an incorporeal thing. Thus, the relationship between phantoms and intellectual activity establishes a paradox when we consider the principle established by Aquinas. Therefore, to philosophically demonstrate that ghosts are the cause of intellectual knowledge, we will analyze Aquinas' comments to book V of Metaphysics by Aristotle, De Causis and De principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum, in order to understand how Aquinas conceives the notion of cause and its axioms. From the notion of instrumental agent treated in De Verit. q. 10, a. 6, add. 7 and, furthermore, from the elasticity that characterizes the notion of cause in the Corpus Thomisticum, is possible to affirm that ghosts are the cause of sensible knowledge, without contradicting the principle that limits the action of a corporeal thing on an incorporeal thing.

The aim of this dissertation aims to present a critique of Axel Honneth’s theory of freedom,
which is developed in his work Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life.
Unlike other models of freedom, such as negative freedom and moral freedom, Honneth,
through the use of the method of normative reconstruction, defends the idea that the realization
of freedom, that is, its process of normative experimentation, is a linked to the model of social
freedom. Such defense, in general terms, occurs for two reasons: the first is because social
freedom is the social precondition of human action; the second reason is because the social
ethos of social freedom, which is Democratic Ethical Life, attests that we are free because they
and they are involved in a series of institutionalized social spheres whose normative task is
internal to social recognition and individual freedom of each individual. This interpretation of
human freedom suggested by the German philosopher, however, presents two problems: the
first problem is that Honneh’s reading of the functioning of the Normative Reconstruction
method leads to the fact that the normadeja sediment of the socidica spheres has an idealist
perspective; as a result, the second problem arises because the author disregards that
Democratic Ethical Life is an instance of social life that produces and reproduces social
injustices, that is, that engenders forms of Social Pathologies. The hypothesis that might solve
these problems, and that I will defend, is the following: the cooperative cultivation of social
freedom can be better developed from the nexus between education and social philosophy,
where the first element helps in the experimentation of the purpose of the second element, which
is the democratic realization of the good life.

Based on the assumption that human beings are not completely rational and are not immune to external influence, the intention here is to analyze the mechanisms that allow influencing behavior and, more specifically, those used in capitalism for the purpose of social control. From the concepts developed by Marx, Freud and their heirs of Critical Theory, the fundamentals of social manipulation and some characteristics of the subject of capitalism, a product of these subjectivity formation techniques, are presented. Allied to this, the very tools that allow the exercise of subjective control are analyzed. The thesis brings into question how advertising, based on the knowledge bequeathed by psychoanalysis, created a structure that made it indispensable for any enterprise and enabled the creation of a machinery to influence behavior. Furthermore, it also discusses how technology has updated manipulation mechanisms through new forms of advertising on social medias and the creation of a way of life based on technological rationality. In this way, the mechanisms of social control are examined, initially in their most fundamental aspects, and investigated in their unfolding, according to the evolution of capitalism.

This dissertation addresses the problem of language in the early Freudian thought, focusing on the monograph On aphasia(1891), a work in which Freud takes his first step towards the construction of metapsychology. In his work, he elaborates a critique of Wernicke and Lichtheim's localizationist theories for language disorders, as well as to the Meynert’s general theory about the functioning of the nervous system. Freudian criticism consists in refuting all the theses that would serve as a support for localizationist theory, which resulted in the construction of a new way of thinking about the interactions between the brain and the psychic function of language and, therefore, of the psyche as a whole. Thus, the Freudian critique of localizationism also demanded a thorough analysis of the psychology underlying the localizationist theses and their due reformulation. This rupture was essential for the constitution of psychoanalysis, since at this point Freud revealed the possibility of building a speculative “psychological” theory, exempt from an immediate concern about anatomical determinism. The problem that drives our study questions the way in which the criticism undertaken by Freud to neurology at the end of the 19th century allowed him to appropriate and subvert the psychology implicit in its foundations, leading him to the formulation of a new representation theory which, in general terms, can be identified as one of the foundations of psychoanalysis in it’s theoretical and clinical dimensions. We understand that the concept of representation forged by Freud can be explained as one of the Grundbegriffs of metapsychological theory, finding it throughout his thought, and it is essential to clarify this concept for the proper understanding of the epistemological contours of psychoanalytic discourse as an original field, as well as the model of psyche involved in its theoretical developments.

The present work aims to draw a possible reading of how to understand the concept of
engagement in Sartre from his work Critique of dialetical reason, published in 1960. To this
end, we initially sought to delineate how this concept is defined within the heart of thought
sartrian of the 40’s, in which he largely refers to his ethical-political proposal the notions
elaborated ih his onto-phenomenological treatise Being and Nothingness (1943). Subsequently,
we present the conceptual plot contained in the Critique, in which Sartre, seeking to scrutinize
the inteligibility of dialectical reason, establishes a dalogue between existetialism and marxism.
Finally, taking up the notion of engagement int the 1940s and in light of the concepts presented
in the Critique, we propose the ethical-politicla direction os engagement as anti-institutional
regrouping.

This research aimed to formulate a possible answer to the following question: what is the criterion that, in Epictetus' view, should be used to carry out correct moral evaluations? Reflections on morality occupy a fundamental place in the lessons of the philosopher from Nicopolis, however, although a good part of his prescriptions imply the application of a criterion in the formation of moral opinions, it is not possible to find in these lessons a systematic presentation of this criterion. For this reason, the practical exercises that seem to form the axis of Epictetus' philosophy, as well as the examples and images that permeate his thought, were the main source in which we sought to identify the specific characteristics of the moral criterion, through analysis , in dialogue with the interpretations of some commentators. Some of the exercises investigated in more depth were the withdrawal from external stimuli to internally recognize the innate notions that refer to moral concepts and are designated as prenotions, and the practice of distinguishing between what is and is not under our charge. With regard to images and analogies, the most relevant examination for the research was on the implications of the scale metaphor and the analogy between moral evaluations and medical diagnoses. Thus, the reflections elaborated during the research made it possible to recognize the following general characteristics as belonging to the moral criterion: i) the moral criterion corresponds to an assertion resulting from the articulation of pre-notions; ii) the same criterion must be replicable in similar contexts; iii) the way in which moral criteria is used is improved through habit.

It´s perceived that both propaedeutic commentators of Hannah Arendt´s books and her more conceptual critics, make such a characteristic and punctual approach between the authority and the freedom, that generally, it´s suspected, it up hiding ends any possibility of the affinity of these concepts. In general lines, this dissertation is guided by the objective of clarifying the possible conciliation between the concepts of authority and freedom in Hannah Arendt´s political philosophy. Books of the 60, notably  On revolution (1963) and Between past and the future (1968), and also some of her essays, in which Arendt asserts that, if on the one hand, the ancient régime distanced the freedom public from men, the seventeenth-century revolutions faced difficulties in an attempt to conceive another anchor reference for a new political authority whose purpose would be to ensure the revolutionary spirit of participation. From a theoretical point of view, it is understood that, when trying to reconcile authority with republican freedom, some modern philosophers ended up denying authority and making full freedom impossible. For Hobbes, but also for Rousseau, authority is understood around the concept of sovereignty. For if for the former authority corresponded to the Sovereign properly constituted and immune to any challenge, for the second, the authority corresponded to the people themselves, who, as a result of a "General Will", ended up being defined in terms of sovereignty. Freedom in Hannah Arendt's work is participation in the affairs of politics, and it is through her that the entire revolution is built. However, if in theory and in practice the establishment of the new republican authority caused a certain impediment to republican freedom, Arendt is based on the actions of the revolutionary council system and proves this incompatibility to be false. To justify this claim, we return to the approach of the sense of politics in the face of the emergence of the totalitarian regime and its source of authority. We also look at how the relationship of the authoritarian regime appears in Hannah Arendt's thinking. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the revolutionary freedom of the council system and the new republican authority in the form of a constitution. Given the above, we believe we can suggest that, despite the concept of sovereignty, Arendt admits a link of conciliation between public authority and freedom

The preoccupation with Man [Mensch] is very present in Marx's youth writings. He finds to establish a concept that accounts for what can be called human essence [menschliche Wesen] or species-being [Gattungswesen]. As this concept also contains what the human being isn’t yet, or rather, what the human being is only potentially, it seems to be an a priori concept. Therefore, this concept isn’t strictly linked to materialistic data and aspects, as Marx wants us to believe when he says that his theory must be based on “real premises” that can be “verified in a purely empirical way” (MARX & ENGELS, 2010d, p. 31). This difficulty, however, isn’t restricted to Marx's youth work. In the Grundrisse, for example, he explicitly uses the expression “species-being [Gattungswesen]”. In Capital, on more than one occasion, he uses the term “human nature [menschliche Natur]”. Furthermore, at various moments in his mature work, Marx continues to treat social and economic reality as divided into two areas, namely, the scope of appearance [Schein] and the scope of essence [Wesen], thus resuming fundamental categories of metaphysics, without which, perhaps, his critique of political economy wouldn’t have been possible. Given this, it is possible to formulate the following questions: what’s the place of the concept of man in Marx's mature work? To what extent is this concept related to the problem of the human essence of youth works? Even he declares himself to be a materialist thinker, wouldn’t Marx still be a tributary of metaphysics because he doesn’t completely abandon certain concepts and categories specific to that form of thought? Nevertheless, does this not appear as a problem within your new [materialist] conception of the world, which is established precisely to oppose the many idealistic conceptions of your time? Thus, it appears that Marx's theoretical endeavor isn’t just based on scientific grounds, and as far move away as possible from the terrain of metaphysics. The object of this research, therefore, is the concept of man in Marx's work, which ends up unfolding in a reflection on some aspects of the relationship between science and metaphysics. Thus, the analysis of that concept is only the first step trying to point critically to other metaphysical aspects of his theory.

The aim of this work is to seek out ways of understanding the concept of human being, but setting out from non-scientific bases. The mental model inherited from the Cartesian philosophy paved the way for the scientific knowledge of the human. Modernity and the advancement of technology reinforce the Cartesian heritage and its dualistic explanation, in which the body and its movement are explained in a disenchanted way, as mere mechanisms. The mental realm also became object of scientific explanation, being described by regularities and causal laws. However, this condition creates paradoxical situations that are unbearable for human consciousness. Thus, it is possible to think of forms of human truth based on intelligibility, intuition and expression, and not on the formulation of sentences that follow the scientific protocols of knowledge. For this, it is necessary to understand the expressive dimension of language. The way we attribute meanings to different everyday situations is anchored in the convention of cultural practices. Narrative here is understood within the spectrum of the expressive speech act. The narrator is the source of meaning in a narrative. The meaning of the narrative does not stem from the logical-causal link among events, but from its ability to express emotions. The truth and the sense, therefore, are necessaril y expressed by a subject imbued with experiences and emotions. This truth is appropriate and legitimate, not opposing to objectivity. Therefore, the way human beings attribute meaning to their experiences is neither scientific nor rational. We attribute meanings through intuition and attunement to cultural practices. Literature, therefore, can be understood as a cultural practice through which we attribute meaning to experiences. Literature achieves universality since it is anchored in a grammar of values shared by culture. Thus, the literary text expresses more than an individual reality, finding resonance among the readers. It is possible to see in modern art several manifestations of the unbearable condition to which the dualistic and scientific explanations have led the human. The Passion According to G. H., a novel by Clarice Lispector, is read in this context. The human-nature opposition gains paradoxical contours in this work. We try to understand better these paradoxical outlines in dialogue with philosophers like Wittgenstein, Peter Hacker, Richard Eldridge, Peter Goldie and Charles Altieri.

RÉSUMÉ

Il est facile de souscrire à la thèse selon laquelle le sens musical est indissociablement perceptif. Ce que nous présentons comme musique, c’est-à-dire l’apparence musicale et son sens incarné, est compris par nous, avant tout, par un effort d’abstraction. En ce sens, sur la base théorique, c'est-à-dire la phénoménologie de la perception du philosophe M. Merleau-Ponty et de son virage ontologique, nous prendrons plus systématiquement la musique et le sens musical, même si le philosophe n'a pas tardé approche. De cette manière, l’objet de la recherche est d’abord créé dans une composition musicale telle qu’elle peut être vécue à travers le processus corporel et perceptif, mais aussi dans la manière dont elle est prise dans le domaine du langage en tant qu’expression du monde, qui prend forme à travers la chanson. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, il est destiné, dans les limites des possibilités présentes, à jeter les bases d’une procédure phénoménologique et ontologique d’analyse musicale, concernant la perception et la signification, donnée dans le monde vécu à partir de l’expérience corporelle et linguistique. Nous explorerons les concepts de sensation, perception, expression, corps, schéma corporel, champ phénoménal et monde en tant que force motrice pour une discussion dans le cadre de la phénoménologie et traiterons de la façon dont ces concepts se déroulent dans le tour ontologique de l'auteur étudié, être appliqué pour penser la musique, en comprenant que Perception et Sens sont des participants à la construction du sens.

The aim of this work is to analyze akrasia and ignorance from reading NE VII.3 in the light of three issues: (i) why do we sometimes act against our better judgment while when we know what we must do? (ii) how can we refer to akrasia in terms of ignorance; and, (iii) which object (teleutaia protasis) it is related to the akratic failure, i.e., which element of the practical syllogism lies in the akratic’s subject failure: it’s a failure of understanding the minor premise or a failure on conclusion of the act? While on the one hand there’s a Socratic opinion, from  Protagoras Plato’s dialogue, that no one could act against what he knows to be correct, except by ignorance, then akrasia doesn’t exist at all; on the other hand, there’s an opinion that is entirely possible for someone, in an affected state, acts contrary to his better judgment, based on the arguments mentioned above and opinions about the phenomenon of akrasia our purpose here consist in analyze akrasia, as a conflict of desires, in order to understand why is it that despite the power of our practical intellect to leader us to practice good actions we are easily influenced by our appetites? In parallel to the Socratic argument on akrasia, we must point out in this contex what kind of ignorance is linked to this phenomenon analyzed by Aristotle. At the end, we aim to explain in a suitable form how the appetite overcomes the boulesis acting as an obstacle for the intellect.

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By following the tracks left by Heidegger, we argue that metaphysical thought should be considered transcendental when: a) it understands the being as a priori; b) as condition of possibility; c) as transcendental regarding the entities and the way we deal with them; and d) when such understanding of being tends to self-foundation, which always takes place associated with a certain conception of men. Thus, the main hypotheses of this dissertation are, namely: i) Heidegger focused on Husserlian theory of truth – which take that into account as experienced and noticed identity in the act of evidence – and on Aristotelian thought regarding noetic truth, thus finding transcendental features which influenced his thinking about the truth as disclosure during the 1920s; ii) the way Heidegger exposed and dealt with truth in the first stage of his philosophy was affected by the four features of the mathematical project-of-being mentioned above. We conclude this dissertation by showing the paths pursued by Heidegger since the 1930s in order to overcome the transcendental perspective which distinguished his first notion of truth.

We intend to deal with the debate about the normative criterion that the contemporary Critical Theory wants to take, considering the thinking of Nancy Fraser as the axis of this debate, observing the challenges that contemporary multicultural societies present to us, the social struggles and their new conformations, late capitalism, and how the theoretical tools of this philosophical tradition can be effective in managing today's social reality. Since the emergence of Critical Theory, the question of how to base social diagnoses and justify statements about the processes of social regression, crisis and emancipatory potentials, is a defining element of the possibility of criticism. The debate covers issues such as the relationship between theory and practice, the place where the critical theorist speaks in relation to the society that analyzes, beyond the historical processes of social development, perceived through this broader picture. In order to maintain the original aim of social critique, to establish diagnoses and prognoses of societies, contemporary critical theorists face the question of how to reconcile the normative character demanded by the critic, with attention to the complex and very dynamic context of societies in capitalist democracies of our time, combining a universalist intention and with the particularity.

This work explores the construction processes of a specific language to philosophy in Bertrand Russell. The aim was to understand how he determined the vocabulary and syntax of the language used in his logical atomism, with attention to the notions of existence and experience. In order to do that, I had to examine how his analysis of propositions and concepts served to this purpose. I have noted that Russell tried to guide these analyses through non-dogmatic precepts, which are align with his idea of a scientific philosophy. I have identified that his analysis of propositions seeks to break with a logic unjustifiably restricted to the subject- predicate form, which he thought to be the origin of a defective grammar and thus cause of superfluous metaphysical problems. Moreover, I have identified that his analysis of concepts always seeks to determine the supposed “most fundamental” meaning of a philosophical notion, understanding that its meaning should consist in “the nucleus” of a word’s multiples usual meanings. Thereby, he hoped to prevent a particular meaning of the word from imposing itself on the others without a reason for it. Taking the analysis of propositions and concepts under that basis, Russell tried to precisely determine the meaning of “experience” and “existence” to compose a grammar free of vagueness and ambiguity, compatible with his scientific philosophy. Regarding to “existence”, Russell defines it as a property of propositional functions. Thus, the proposition “a exists” could be best understood as “‘x is a’ is possible” or “‘x is a’ is sometimes truth”. I argue that the meaning of “existence” is further complemented by the fundamental meaning of “experience”, which can be found in the notion of acquaintance. I pointed out that “existence” and “acquaintance” are defined in symbiosis, so that all that exists in the strict sense of the word is what is known by acquaintance. The thesis structure is divided into three chapters. Chapter

1 introduces logical atomism and shows why Russell takes it as a scientific philosophy. Chapter 2 explains its capital method – which is logical analysis – and provides two examples of analysis of propositions. Finally, Chapter 3 shows how the analysis of propositions and concepts serves to the construction of a philosophical grammar. In addition, an annex brings the translations of two texts, “Le réalisme analytique” and “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, after a commentary on the thesis’ impact on our translation choices.

The scope of the present work is the search for a responsible hermeneutics. We call responsible the interpretation in which the subject-interpreter, as being-in-the-world, reflects on the process of interpretation and the validity of his interpretations. We evaluate the problem that involves the conflicts of interpretations in general lines, but also specifically in the legal domain. We examine the consequences of divergent interpretations of legal norms that sometimes culminate in disparate judicial decisions, which on the one hand can generate legal uncertainty, and on the other fosters judicial creativity and the progress of law. We base our study on Paul Ricoeur's thought, in which self-understanding is a sine qua non condition for interpretation, i.e., to understand oneself is to narrate one's own existence manifested in face of the text. In order to do so, we will examine Ricoeur's Hermeneutic path of understanding, claiming that self-understanding does not stem from a solipsistic introspection, but rather is mediated by otherness and the meaning of signs. It is in this context that we raise an ethical responsibility that must guide the interpretation of legal texts, because in the context of self-understanding and in the search for narrative identity we exercise moral judgment and ask ourselves about this moral subject of imputation. This is again an opportunity to reassess ourselves at every turn as an interpreter.

The movies spectator has different ways of approaching a film. Some of these ways are developed socially, other are intuitively. We divided our study into two methods used not only by the spectator of movies – or cinema – but also by the philosophy. The first one is the analytic method, at the same time naturally inscribed in a person and developed socially. Naturally inscribed because instinctively we tend to trace distinctions between what we found in the world and what we found in ourselves. Socially, because the human being is naturally turned to the work in common with its peers, and during the production of this work are constructed conventions (creation of symbols, of language). The second, the intuition, is our immediate contact with the world, before the insertion of any symbol into this experience to concretize the flow. It is by intuition that we find ourselves in front of duration, the natural flow of things, without the cut of separate states. Bergson calls intuition the sympathy that drags us into the interior of things, allowing us access in its duration. In the case of cinema, it is by this sympathy that the spectator nourishes for the movie that one is allowed to enter the film, transforming it’s duration into one’s own. This distinction between two methods has as base the formulation created by Henri Bergson in a work entitled Introdução à metafísica, that allows us advance into both methods. Our goal with this distinction is to study the diverse possibilities of approach, of action, that the spectator disposes when watching and experimenting a movie. The cinephilia here studied has, therefore, the meaning of emotion: the experience of plenitude that is felt by the spectator that watches a movie. This does not happens in a passive way by the part of the spectator, oneself an agent, imagining, working intellectually to inscribe the movie into one’s own life, into one’s conscience, like the different methods of approach of a movie inserted by the kingdoms of analytic and intuition presents us. The spectator sees oneself as a creator also. Our effort of creating a metaphysical study of cinephilia as emotion brings us to see the play inherent both methods and the communion between cinephile and movie. What makes the cinephile nourish one’s emotion for the cinema beyond the moment when ceases to watch a movie. The movie continue to exist into one’s consciousness. Cinephilia is also, and above all, what drives the spectator back to the movies.

This paper aims to discuss critically the problem of epistemic normativity regarding naturalized epistemology. The thesis proposes that a naturalized epistemology can claim a normative dimension and that epistemic norms are descriptive types that acquire normative force in function of practical demands. This solely means that normative character arises in the application of epistemology descriptive results. To support this thesis, I make a broad presentation on the canonical position, referred as traditional epistemology. In contrast, bearing in mind the interests of the research, I make a thorough assessment of how some naturalistic positions understand the normative dimension. This evaluation seeks to show how the notion of justification, usually tied to that of rationality and normativity, fulfills a fundamental importance in the understanding of the epistemology that we intend to criticize. This criticism is followed by an attempt to provide another understanding of epistemic rationality, thought here as instrumental rationality, thereby abdicating any notion of justification in the characterization of normativity. This to argue that the question of the normativity of epistemology from a naturalistic perspective implies another way of understanding the evaluative dimension of knowledge, no longer in opposition, but integrated with our best empirical investigations of reality.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the concept of novum institutum, here also called the life forms, in order to highlight the approximation between knowledge and existence in the philosophy of Espinosa. The relation between knowing and existing implies deciding for what is most convenient to potentiate our existence. In this way, from a the life forms marked by distractions (distraithur) to a more potent life form, we will call it a ferry. The hypothesis that guided us is the possibility, based on premisses yielded by the espinosana philosophy, we think about the possibility of a singular way to think about its own existence. That is to say, it becomes, to some extent, aware of the possibility of establishing for itself forms of existence. We understand that from the denaturation of traditional values and the cultivation of desire for a more powerful life Espinosa presents a sophisticated path to increase the autonomy of the individual and the institution of a new form of existence. Our work has as main reference the Tractatus of Intellectus Emendatione (TIE), besides the Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata.