This dissertation investigates how the transformations of liberal governmentality into neoliberalism reconfigure the relationship between subjectivity and economic power, producing specific forms of naturalization and depoliticization of social life. Drawing on the Foucauldian analytics of power, the study shifts the question of freedom from a juridical-normative right to an examination of the technologies of government that historically fabricate economic subjects, regimes of truth, and fields of experience organized around political economy.

Chapter 1 reconstructs the conceptual framework of liberal governmentality by articulating the Foucauldian concepts of sovereignty, discipline, biopolitics, and state racism. It demonstrates how modern raison d’État is constituted through dispositifs such as statistics and administrative policing, and how political economy emerges as a principle of governmental self-limitation. The chapter shows that the market becomes an instance of veridiction — a privileged site for the production of truth concerning the rationality of public policies — thereby displacing political legitimacy from the juridical sphere to the domain of measurable economic efficiency. By bringing Foucault into dialogue with critical readings by Macpherson, Marx, Polanyi, Mbembe, and Denise Ferreira da Silva, the dissertation makes explicit how this rationality operates through constitutive exclusions of race, class, and coloniality, producing hierarchies between lives that must be fostered and lives exposed to death.

Chapter 2 shifts the focus to the production of subjectivities within this governmental rationality. Freedom is analyzed as a technology of government that liberalism must produce, organize, and consume, rather than as a natural attribute preceding the state. Security dispositifs are examined as a specific liberal technology operating through the differential management of risks and statistical modulation, governing through circulation and risk. The dissertation reconstructs the figure of the liberal homo economicus as a subject of interest and, subsequently, as human capital under neoliberalism, demonstrating how the enterprise form and generalized competition produce subjectivities permanently exposed to dispositifs of evaluation and responsibilization.

Based on this trajectory, the dissertation argues that liberal-neoliberal governmentality fabricates an economic subject who recognizes in the “laws” of the market not merely an external limit to political power, but the very grammar of social reality itself. This configuration contributes to the naturalization of relations of domination and hinders the formulation of criteria of critique capable of escaping economic veridiction. The genealogical analysis reveals the historical contingency of arrangements that present themselves as necessary, thereby opening space for the critical denaturalization of contemporary forms of economic subjectivation.

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between consciousness (nothingness) and radical contingency in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), taking as its main axis The Transcendence of the Ego and Nausea. It argues that, in distinct registers, these works allow us to clarify consciousness as negativity and openness to the world, as well as the radical contingency of existence. From this, it investigates in what sense the articulation between philosophy and literature contributes to explicating the concrete human condition, without reducing literature to mere conceptual illustration. Finally, it discusses how the absence of a prior foundation for existence opens the field of the subject's self-constitution in the world.

This dissertation investigates the articulation between violence, alienation, and subjectivity in the thought of Frantz Fanon (2020; 2022), with particular emphasis on the political implications developed in The Wretched of the Earth and their relation to the question of subjectivity as examined in Black Skin, White Masks. The central problem consists in understanding how colonial violence, both in its objective and subjective dimensions, produces a specific fracture in the constitution of the colonized subject, and under what conditions Fanonian desalienation can be conceived as an effective rupture with the structure that generated such a fracture. The dissertation advances the hypothesis that this rupture articulates, in an inseparable manner, the subjective transformation of the colonized and the refusal of the order that constituted him as such, without implying either a return to a precolonial essence or a symmetrical inversion of positions within the same colonial matrix. The operative concept through which this hypothesis is developed is that of sociogenic fracture, a category used to describe the historical process by which colonization inscribes a division within the subjectivity of the colonized, a division whose overcoming requires the practical and material transformation of the social conditions that produced it. Three auxiliary categories formulated throughout the study are articulated to this hypothesis: negogeny, critical torsion, and ontological resistance through negation. The analytical approach combines an immanent reading of Fanon's major works with a critical engagement with the specialized literature, drawing on the contributions of Faustino (2018a; 2021), Gordon (2015), Wynter (2001), Sekyi-Otu (1996), Dussel (1993), Carneiro (2023), Sodré (2017), and Mbembe (2018; 2022), among others. The dissertation is structured into two chapters. The first establishes the conceptual foundations of the problem and examines the objective dimension of colonial violence through The Wretched of the Earth, engaging with the spatial structure of the colonial world, the Hegelian dialectic of recognition, the zone of nonbeing, and liberatory violence as a practice of decolonization. The second chapter, devoted to Black Skin, White Masks, examines the subjective dimension of this violence through five analytical movements, ranging from the hypothesis of sociogenic fracture to desalienation as a demand for rupture. The study contributes to a more rigorous understanding of alienation in its specifically colonial form by rejecting both culturalist interpretations that reduce colonization to a problem of representation and economic reductionist approaches that dissolve racial specificity into class determinations. In their place, it proposes a reading of Fanon (2020; 2022) as a philosopher whose work articulates, simultaneously, the material and subjective dimensions of colonialism. 

We seek to understand why Thomas Aquinas found it necessary to assimilate Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite as an authority and how this assimilation enabled the composition of a Neoplatonic thought-matrix within an Aristotelian scientific framework. Thus, we aim to formulate a theological science based on the premises of the via remotionis as transcendence, through the epistemological possibility of analogy and metaphor. The incorporation of Dionysius does not appear as an extrinsic or merely devotional element, but as a response to an internal requirement of the Thomistic project itself, which needed conceptual instruments capable of treating separate realities and the Divine Principle according to an epistemological regime adequate to its transcendence. In this sense, we reconstruct the genealogy of the reception of the Corpus Dionysiacum from its origins to its intellectual elevation in the 13th century, showing how the systematic reading undertaken by Albert the Great was decisive in consolidating Dionysius as a philosophical-theological authority and in preparing the horizon upon which Aquinas could operate his own reelaboration.

By confronting Albert the Great’s commentaries on The Divine Names with those of Thomas Aquinas, the properly epistemological questions of theology become visible. While in Albert there is a predominance of the symbolic and hierarchical exposition of Dionysian thought, in Thomas this material is reorganized within a theory of knowledge that articulates operations of the intellect, the centrality of judgment, and the distinction between essence and being (esse). From this configuration, the lineage of the Areopagite’s thought is understood as integrated into a theological science that proceeds through proportional affirmations, without the pretension of a direct apprehension of the Divine essence, but rather of a reintegration with the One as Principle.

Thomas embraced Dionysius holistically, making him the third most cited author in his entire corpus, and his theology was structured also upon celestial hierarchy and negative theology. Based on this reading, we unravel the triplex via to show how, from the impossibility of stating what God is, an affirmative path opens, founded on causality, analogy, participation, and eminence. The via remotionis (way of negation) occupies a decisive structural position, for it establishes the internal limit of every theological affirmation. By removing from God not only imperfections but also the finite modes of signifying inherent to concepts extracted from the sensible, the negative way prevents divine names from being understood according to a univocal or quidditative regime. The apophatic function does not suspend knowledge but prepares it, preserving the ontological difference between the Divine Principle and created beings, and ensuring that every affirmation remains ordered toward the transcendence of the Divine essence. Negation is established as the condition of possibility for affirmative theology, as it delimits the reach of the intellect to the plane of being and causality, opening the space in which analogy, participation, and eminence can ground true judgments without reducing the Absolute to the measure of the human concept.

The via causalitatis (way of causality) grounds theological affirmation by recognizing that the perfections present in created beings proceed from a First Principle that communicates them according to the order of participation. This causal relationship establishes an analogical regime of signification, in which perfections are affirmed of God as the fountal cause and of beings as effects, according to diverse proportions of being. Analogy ensures that divine names possess a real reference to the Principle and express the ontological difference between the simple mode of Divine subsistence and the participated mode of creatures. The via eminentiae (way of eminence) elevates this recognition by affirming that the causally recognized perfections subsist in God in a supereminent manner, according to a degree of being that corresponds to the simplicity and plenitude of the Principle. Thus, causality, analogy, and eminence jointly structure a theological affirmation proportional to the human mode of knowing and ordered toward the intelligibility of the transcendent. The recognition of the limit of language leads not to the suspension of discourse, but to the constitution of a theology proceeding through proportional inferences and symbols.

At the end of Festschrift (1899), Hilbert stated that the purity of the method is a ‘subjective’ requirement. However, in his reconstruction of Euclidean geometry, he adopted two clearly purist requirements: (1) to avoid the use of Archimedes’ axiom in elementary propositions. and (2) to demonstrate geometric versions of the Common Notions. These requirements seek an autonomous foundation for geometry and exclude the use of external notions, such as number or general magnitude. What is the epistemic value of these requirements? Can they be justified in any way, or are they merely idiosyncratic? This is the ‘open problem’ of purity in Hilbert. The thesis argues that its justification is essentially dialogical: it depends on philosophical images about the nature of mathematical knowledge and belongs to the realm of rational choices, not to that of ‘technical’ axiomatic analysis. In doing so, the thesis fills two gaps in the current literature: the normative dimension of purity and the conceptualisation of the relationship between purity and the axiomatic method.

The discussion is structured as follows. First, the epistemic function of purity identifies a problem of foundations for which autonomous foundation constitutes a possible (though not the only) solution. At this level, the purist solution is justified by appealing to an ‘architectural’ image of theories and to the adoption of an elementary point of view in reconstruction. Second, the methodological function of purity guides axiomatic research, inducing specific modes of reconstruction. Here, the axiomatic method can show whether a purist requirement is achievable, thus operating as a tool of methodological criticism that enhances the rational evaluation of these requirements. However, this requires the adoption of an image of formal axiomatic theory according to which it maintains an ‘analogy’ with the elementary facts of geometry; otherwise, purist requirements would be directly meaningless. This analogy constitutes the axiomatic expression of the elementary point of view.

Finally, in the absence of a more precise denomination, the concept of deep justification is introduced, understood as that which appeals to an image of the very nature of mathematics. This image corresponds to the ‘conceptual style’ à la Dedekind and the type of methodological formalism that derives from it. From this perspective, purist demands are justified by the requirement that calculation with geometric magnitudes be a result of theory, rather than a prior constitutive element. From an ex ante point of view, this tripartite division can be understood as a progressive effort to offer increasingly substantive reasons, insofar as they appeal to more basic images of knowledge. In this sense, the conceptual style functions as a kind of ultimate justification for purist demands, while the epistemic function represents an “initial motivation”. However,images of knowledge are also justified ex post, fundamentally for reasons of mathematical fertility linked to the generalisation of methods. In this inverse sense, Hilbert conceived of the conceptual style as responsible for the great mathematical advances of the 19th century, with the axiomatic method being the ‘apex’ of this style. Thus, the axiomatic realisation of the conceptual style introduces an architectural image of theories and an analogy between them and geometric intuition. A reconstruction of this type then satisfies the epistemic function: what is justified is the type of solution adopted. The thesis consequently shows the interaction between ex ante and ex post justifications, as well as their expression in Hilbert’s axiomatic practice.

The present study aims primarily to analyze Nietzsche’s philosophy through the notion
of suspicion. On the one hand, suspicion manifests itself as a critical posture operating
within Nietzschean thought, especially with regard to its confrontation with the ideal of
truth upheld by philosophical dogmatism. On the other hand, Nietzsche himself
becomes the object of suspicion in various interpretative readings: both the form of his
writing and the provocative character of his ideas have, since the late nineteenth
century, elicited diverse reactions, ranging from enthusiastic admiration to vehement
rejection. Thus, the German philosopher emerges as a thinker who, while casting
suspicion into the very core of philosophy, also remains enveloped by it. The
investigation therefore seeks to understand this dual meaning of suspicion in Nietzsche
– both as a philosophical stance and as a hallmark of his historical reception.

The aim of this paper is to investigate, through Wittgenstein's notion of aspect-seeing, what might be the case, from the reader's point of view, for the literary text to be seen as a way of articulating knowledge.

The problem at hand is linked to the debate undertaken by contemporary philosophy of literature about the cognitive value of literary art, mostly centered around the question of whether or not literary discourse is capable of providing relevant orientation in the life-world. John Gibson's literary humanism is taken as a starting point, for theoretical context.

Throughout this dissertation, we seek to develop an investigation of the existentialist theses developed by Simone de Beauvoir, seeking theoretical support to understand the problem of gender as a social construction, expressed in her famous statement: "no one is born a woman, they become a woman" (BEAUVOIR , 2016b, p. 11). Furthermore, we seek to discuss possible paths for women's liberation from the limitations imposed by the facticity of their existence, towards transcendence, as developed by Beauvoir in The Second Sex. We understand that the philosopher criticizes the imposition of gender roles, arguing that inequalities are not biological, but social and cultural, an original philosophical idea, since, although Beauvoir did not use the term "gender", she separates sex and of what we understand today as gender, anticipating discussions about identity and social roles. The research analyzes how Beauvoir's philosophy proposes an ethics of ambiguity, in which freedom and limitation coexist, and how her existentialist feminist theory questions the destiny imposed on women and the biological and psychoanalytic myths that perpetuate this oppression. The author also explores gender phenomenology, highlighting the transformations of the female body and how social roles restrict their freedom. The dissertation aims to highlight Beauvoir's impact on feminist theory and the importance of her ideas for understanding gender inequalities and the struggle for women's liberation.

This research aims to examine Althusser's theory of ideology and its reflections on
philosophy, investigating the interrelations between these concepts throughout his intellectual
production. Althusser's theory of ideology can be conceived from two distinct moments: the
first, of an epistemological nature, addresses ideology in relation to scientific knowledge,
defining it as the "pre-history" of science. The second moment is characterized by a socio-
political analysis, in which ideology plays a central role in the reproduction of relations of
production, with the materiality of ideology, carried out through the Ideological State
Apparatuses (ISAs), as its original and central element. Simultaneously, Althusser develops
his theory/conception of philosophy in general and Marxist philosophy—or the Marxist
position in philosophy—in particular. These studies evolve throughout the philosopher's
intellectual trajectory, initially conceiving philosophy in general as fully identified with
ideology, while Marxist philosophy is closer to a scientific discipline. These understandings
undergo successive reformulations, eventually leading to the comprehension of philosophy as,
ultimately, class struggle in theory. The results of this study indicate that although Althusser's
conceptions of ideology and philosophy initially develop in parallel, they progressively
intertwine. Philosophy emerges as a "theoretical laboratory," playing a crucial role in unifying
various secondary ideologies into a dominant ideology.

Our main issue is focused on asking which is the ground of the multiplicity of world perspectives that support our day-to-day assertions on anything, as well as the general knowledge. Considering the assumption that such assertions are perspectives, which become truths of a certain time, we take the conception of truth established by Heidegger. His viewpoint is that our assertions about the world come from a “primordial truth” or alētheia. Our objective is to investigate how the primordial truth was formed and how its nexus happens in true and false enounces. We focused our research process on Being and Time (1927) and on texts of the 1930’s. Once the primordial truth is defined on these texts as an opening, we show how this opening is a source of comprehensibility and interlacing of the Dasein with the world. As follows, we ask which could be the ground of the truth as alētheia. Based on Heidegger’s philosophy, we expose that this ground is freedom, understood as a state-of- mind [Stimmung], in other words, with an opening of the Dasein to the world, in which it allows the being becoming what it really is. Such as the truth, freedom is primordial, once it opens the possibilities of becoming to the Dasein, through which it encompasses the truth of the beings. We conclude that primordial freedom grounds the primordial truth, and both ground the appearance of beings and, simultaneously, the world perspectives which substantiate knowledge.

The aim of this paper is to develop the idea that it is possible to adopt a deviant stance in the process of self-making, one that leads to the subversion of the norms that give rise to the subject, rather than merely reproducing them. This will be achieved through a theoretical exploration of what is commonly referred to as Queer Studies, with a focus on the theories of Judith Butler and Paul B. Preciado and their interpretations of Michel Foucault's writings on power relations and regimes of truth. We will then examine some of the criticisms this theory has faced, aiming to update it and enable its use with reservations. The goal is to highlight both the strengths and weaknesses that should be considered when critically applying these Queer Studies to the context of Brazil and Latin America.

The present work aims to investigate the notion of will and its foundations in the theories of Freud and Nietzsche, focusing more specifically on what these authors identify as the foundations of human will, that is, the tendencies that drive the subject to action and guide their psychodynamics. In doing so, we propose a comparative analysis between their respective theories of the Trieb: the doctrine of the will to power and the theory of drives. To this end, we used both the authors’ own writings on the respective topics and those of some of their commentators, as well as the existing literature on the possible relationships between these theories. As a result, we found in the literature a range of opinions regarding the relationship between Freud’s theory and Nietzsche’s theory: some categorically deny the plausibility of considering their ideas as compatible or sympathetic to one another, while others affirm a very significant convergence between them. From our own reading of both authors’ texts, we conclude that the convergence between their theories of Trieb appears to be significant, aligning with the latter group of theorists and disagreeing with the former. We then seek to justify this assertion based on textual evidence that supports this interpretation.

This dissertation investigates the relationship between critical attitude and practices of freedom in Michel Foucault's thought, with an emphasis on his problematization of contemporary forms of subjection. Drawing on the notion of Aufklärung, understood as a critical stance toward forms of government and power, and on parrhesia, conceived as an ethical-political practice of truth-telling, the study analyzes how the subject can resist the excessive conduct of their behavior under modern regimes of governmentality. The first part examines the relationship between critical attitude, governmentality, and the liberal conception of freedom, highlighting critique as a mode of resistance. The second part analyzes Foucault’s reflections on parrhesia, exploring its articulation with the notions of care of the self, government of self and others, and especially the idea that the history of ancient philosophy can be interpreted through the lens of parrhesiastic practice. Finally, the study investigates the articulation between the meanings of Aufklärung and parrhesia, with the aim of understanding the role of philosophy as a critical attitude and a practice of interrogating the present. By articulating critical attitude and practices of freedom, this dissertation argues that critique does not reveal an inner essence, but inaugurates a continuous process of self-constitution. In doing so, it not only deepens the debate on Foucault’s philosophy but also offers an reflection on the possibilities of reinventing modes of existence in the contemporary world.

Cognitivism is a research program that takes the comparison of the mind to a
computer seriously. This program is based on the idea of mental representations and
computations on representations to explain how cognitive processes can occur. Post-
Cognitivism is a proposed research program that arises in contrast to Cognitivism and
consists primarily of two independent lines of research, namely enactivism and ecological
psychology. These lines of research share a common core commitment to define the nature of
cognition, emphasizing the role of the body in cognitive processes, the role of the
environment in which the organism develops its cognitive abilities, and the non-
representational character of cognition. A criticism often leveled at post-cognitivist
approaches is how they can explain cognitive performances considered “representation-
hungry”, such as imagining, planning, calculating, inferring, and also the use of language. In
this sense, this research presents two enactivist theories, Radical Enactivism and Ecological
Enactivism, and how each of them propose a theory of language. The present research aims
to explore a solution to the explanatory integration challenge (i.e., the separation or not of
cognitive performances between higher and lower levels) in order to establish a possible
reconciliation between Radical Enactivism and Ecological Enactivism.

Work has increasingly revealed itself as a stage for multiple forms of violence. Accidents, illness, harassment, and discrimination are phenomena that have come to occupy a prominent position in the media. The place that should serve as a stage for personal fulfillment and human emancipation has instead become a setting of violence and oppression. Much has been written about violence in the world of labor, its causes, and its harmful effects on workers’ health. One may indeed find in work what is worst, but it is also possible to extract from it what is best in us. Work is a place in which the subject is revealed and where the potentialities of acting in concert come to light.

Our understanding is that Hannah Arendt’s thought offers significant insights for thinking about the world of work through the potentialities of the human being who labors in this privileged and plural space. Although, in Arendt’s view, modernity is marked by the triumph of the animal laborans and work has become merely a means of earning a living, starting from the premise that the human condition is a triad—composed of labor, work, and action—it is possible to believe that the workplace is not only the site of survival, but also a place for the realization of higher values, such as the ingenuity of homo faber and the potentialities of human actors.

In contrast to Marx’s thought, Arendt seeks to recover the dignity of politics, which disappears when Marx reduces human beings to animal laborans. Therefore, in light of these considerations, we aim to reflect on Arendt’s concept of labor in contrast with the diverse forms of human work present in the modern world, on the viability of political freedom within the work environment, and especially on the possibility that workers, in human intercourse and by assuming their plural human condition, may form political bodies, struggle for better living and working conditions, and confront all forms of violence that occur in the workplace.

With the title “From care of the self to renunciation of the self: the emergence of early Christian spirituality,” the research carried out aimed to investigate how modes of subjectivation occurred in the context of Greco-Roman and Hellenistic culture and in early Christianity, using as a guiding thread the care of the self and the techne tou biou. In the particular case of early Christian spirituality, the investigation focuses on the processes of desubjectivation and subjectivation resulting from Christian technologies of the self, taking as a reference the thought of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. It is therefore a Foucauldian reading of the modes of production and the constitution of Christian subjectivity. From the perspective of practices of the self, the renunciation of the self in Christian practices is verified through the essential paradox existing in these practices, insofar as the process of constitution of subjectivity entails the imperative requirement of desubjectivation. The processes of individuation, subjectivation, and desubjectivation were the main focus of this work. The perspective of this research retrieves Christian practices of the self and their knowledge-power dispositifs in an effort to understand the fundamental particularities of the genesis of the “Christian” subject.

This thesis investigates the place and function occupied by the novel Nausea in the philosophical context of the 1930s in Sartrean thought. To this end, we initially address the specificities of the relationship between philosophy and literature in Sartre, as well as his notion of “creative unity”. Then, when we analyze the subjectivity of philosophical construction and the existential phenomenology project, we note that when Sartre criticizes Husserl's conception of the ego, the motivations and justification of Epoché, he realizes that this suspension is not an intellectual method, but an anguish, this leads us to elucidate an internal need of Sartre's philosophy in relation to literature, which is to understand human reality in its ambiguity and contingency, since they are not reducible to philosophical conceptual expression. Finally, by examining the novel Nausea considering the philosophical background and literary problems belonging to the Sartrian phenomenological-existential construction, we explain that the novel function is the literary idealism deconstruction in face of the bourgeois spirit, as well as the subject idea, and that the place occupied by the novel in Sartrian creative unit is a double of Sketch for a Theory of Emotions.

This research was guided by the objective of structuring a theory of judicial decision-making that acknowledges the inseparable and necessary relationship between philosophical and legal hermeneutics. For this reason, it is a legal-philosophical theory. This theory is grounded in the urgency of elucidating the presuppositions of the interpretative act concerning facticity, the hermeneutic circle, and understanding as fundamental modes of being, according to Martin Heidegger's thought. The proposal situates the hermeneutic procedure of judicial decision-making within its ontological foundation, where authentic existence and the freedom of choice become central to the act of judging. The analysis begins with the understanding that the judge, as a being-in-the-world, is inevitably immersed in facticity—that is, in the set of historical, cultural, and social conditions that constitute the context of their existence and actions. This facticity, far from being an obstacle, is the starting point for understanding and interpretation within the legal domain. Our theory highlights that judicial decision-making must be understood as an interpretative act embedded in the inescapable hermeneutic circle, which is not a logical flaw but the very structure of understanding. We aim to demonstrate the elasticity of understanding as a space of choice, although it is often obstructed by Dasein's inauthentic condition. This dynamic reveals that the act of judging is never neutral or solitary but is constructed in collaboration with other Daseins. In other words, judicial decision-making always stems from being-with. The theory also emphasizes the role of anxiety as a privileged mode of being that can lead the judge-Dasein to break away from the impersonal. In the experience of anxiety, the act of deciding becomes an expression of Dasein's freedom, an escape from arbitrariness, and a more responsible condition for utilizing the space of its fullest potential for being.

This doctoral thesis analyzes the concept of natural religion in Voltaire’s philosophical thought, with particular attention to its role as the rational foundation of morality. Within the context of the Enlightenment, Voltaire shifts the foundations of traditional religion based on revelation, dogma, and divine providence to a rational morality grounded in human nature and in the universal principles of reason, justice, and benevolence. By rejecting both supernatural revelation and the existence of innate ideas, Voltaire proposes a religion purified of dogmatic elements, understood as a moral system common to humankind. The investigation begins with Voltaire’s critique of traditional theology, moves through his reflections on the problem of evil, and emphasizes the value of science as a means of accessing nature and the order of the world. Finally, it argues that, for Voltaire, natural religion constitutes a philosophical alternative to theology, in which morality assumes a central normative and guiding role in social life. Drawing on modern science, particularly Newtonian physics, Voltaire adopts a conception of nature based on rational and stable laws, which makes it possible to uphold the idea of a morality independent of Revelation. Based on an understanding of human nature as endowed with reason and sociability, Voltaire proposes a universal morality accessible to all people. Thus emerges a form of practical theism in which God, though not intervening in the world, serves as a rational principle of order and social cohesion. Natural religion, therefore, turns not toward dogma but toward the moral and political utility of belief in God. It is concluded that, in Voltaire, religion is not abolished but redefined as a rational support for morality and the common good.

This dissertation investigates the concept of egoism in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, proposing its transvaluation as an affirmative principle of self-creation rather than as a moral vice or ethical deviation, as it is traditionally understood by Christian morality and modern philosophy. From a critical analysis of the metaphysics of the subject and of moral doctrines that associate egoism with the negation of the other, it is argued that, in Nietzsche, egoism is an expression of the will to power, that is, of the individual’s capacity to affirm their singularity, interpret affects, and create their own values. By displacing the center of subjectivity from reason to affects, the German philosopher reformulates the foundations of moral evaluation, showing that all valuation is inseparable from an affective dynamic. The theoretical path of the thesis is organized in three moments: the deconstruction of the idea of the subject as a moral substance; the critique of the morality of resentment and compassion as forms of repression of affects; and, finally, the elaboration of an affirmative ethics in which egoism emerges as self-care and a style of existence. Drawing on commentators such as Gilles Deleuze, Gianni Vattimo, Roberto Machado, and Scarlett Marton, the thesis maintains that Nietzschean egoism is a condition for individuation and resistance to the normative regulation of life. It is, therefore, a matter of understanding egoism not as a rejection of ethical life, but as its highest form of affirmation and as a creative power of the self.

Angela Davis's critical thinking is an important source for the uses of freedom and the comprehension of the limits. Even today, the freedom issue faces great precedents in philosophy. The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between the blues and emancipation through Angela Davis, in an attempt to provide a reading that incorporates philosophical thinking, the use of music in the conception of the concept, and the practice of freedom. Proposing to connect to political and cultural dimensions, in the work Blues Legacies and Black Feminism, Davis develops a study that aims to analyze the trajectory of classic blues singers as contributors to the struggle for the emancipation of black people. Then, to delve into the proposed object and understand the analyses developed by Angela Davis regarding the blues and emancipation, the dissertation will be divided into three chapters: one is dedicated to discussing the general relationship between art and politics, the second to analyze the question of emancipation and the last to examine the blues in the philosopher's thoughts. At the end of this work, it aims to elucidate the hypothesis that the blues are related to emancipation by catalyzing the emancipatory process, through the creation of an autonomous sexual, creative, and conscious subjectivity of the collective struggle and the important role of black women, or better yet, which denies the imposed sensitivity by the slavery and dominant capitalist group. From the blues, a new consciousness is formed, and radical emancipation becomes a real possibility. Thus, it is a vision that sees music as a possibility of creating new subjects, who will be able to promote a conscious and collective denial of the established reality.

The dynamics established through the modern expansion of industrial activity, when
capitalism was in the initial phase of its development, determined changes in social, economic
and political conditions, establishing a new code of conduct for individuals in society. In
Fundamental Lines of the Philosophy of Law, Hegel diagnoses the pathologies in bourgeois
civil society. If, on the one hand, the expansion of the market economy favors the
accumulation of wealth, on the other hand, however, it also generates poverty. Our objective
was to analyze the Hegelian conception of poverty in civil society. Poverty is a fundamental
issue, as it calls into question the legitimization of rational ethical life and the actualization of
freedom. Here, we retrace Hegel’s steps from his critical fortunes, to present his conception,
that is, the concept, its effectiveness and possible solutions to poverty. In the first chapter, we
present the Hegelian concept of poverty, as it necessarily emerges from the dynamics in civil
society; in the second, we investigate the consequences of poverty as a loss of what
constitutes the fundamental characteristic of modern times, the subjective freedom of the
individual, their right to be recognized and honored as such and the guarantee of existing in
and by society; Finally, we examine the solutions for overcoming poverty presented by Hegel
and establish their limits.

Morality universally occupies an eminent place in human life and encompasses all cultures. However, the contemporary way of life immersed in the global complexity of technological, digital and economic scientism directly impacts people's actions and moral conscience. Well, these global interests, controversially, cause an individualistic, fragmented and relativistic society. Thus, it is clear that the world is in need of macroethics that corresponds to the global profile of human actions. The challenge is to reconstruct a normative and morally universal ethical current. The research in question, expressed by the title: “The ethics of Discourse from the perspective of morality and universal solidarity” proposes a conceptual investigation into the understanding of morality, ethicality and solidarity, in Jürgen Habermas. It is based on language, communicative and interactive reason, practical discourse, mutual understanding, rationally motivated agreement and the solidary and abstract defense of universal principles that defend the inviolability and invulnerability of human life. The purpose is to show that Discourse Ethics, despite having a formalist, cognitivist, procedural and universalist character, is interested in and defends universal moral contents. The problem develops, firstly around the foundation of the moral principle, breaking the Kantian monological understanding and proposing the universal dialogical principle as a way of guiding consensus among participants. Second, the criticisms and disagreements made by E. Tugendhat and S. Benhabib regarding the way in which Habermas systematizes the ethics of Discourse are presented, but always defending the possibility of moral universality, whether through an attitude of cooperation and solidarity, or through universal respect and interactive reason among agents. Finally, the identity of agents capable of guiding themselves and acting based on principles and universal solidarity is defended. It discusses the theory of the development of moral consciousness in L. Kohlberg, especially the post-conventional stage of morality, to confirm that reconstructive sciences, aligned with communicative reason, contribute greatly to the formation of a moral consciousness capable of providing agents, through rational agreement and solidarity among themselves and with the human race, with interest in and defense of abstract and universal contents and principles that safeguard human dignity globally. 

This dissertation’s objective is to elucidate the relations between body and memory in the philosophy of the last Merleau-Ponty, whose thought in general approaches sensibility and perceptual experience. Our efforts are centered in The Visible and the Invisible, his last and unfinished book, as in it we found considerations concerning an “indirect ontology”, sign of the last phase of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Thinking the “flesh”, fundamental concept in order to reunite bodies and world in a ontological community, the author’s philosophy intends to go to the originary of the sensible experience, searching, in the way of an “indirect method”, the “savage” or “brute Being” that motivates and exceeds perception. In this context there is a discentering of the subject, what provides certain autonomy and independence to temporality, revealing a “ontological history” that belongs to the world and a Nature understood as selfproductive matrix of the senses of experience. Thus, we see the construction of a theory of expression that reveals human history as a fragment of the Earth’s history, and that reveals the cultural world not as rupture, but as continuity of the “natural being”, as the cultural Logos is supported by the Logos of the aesthetical world. In this direction, every memory is “Memory of the World”, comprehensible by the resumption of a sedimented past that constatly updates itself in the lived experiencies, and that institutes the sense of being a body in opening of a profound and common sensible.

This work aims to argue that the norm of appropriate assertion does not require knowledge as a requirement. To do so, initially, I will attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of a milder assertoric epistemic standard compared to knowledge. This plausibility will be emphasized as follows: (i) by advocating for the possibility of a norm of assertion independent of the doxastic state of belief, showing the existence of appropriate assertion without knowledge, since belief is a prerequisite for knowing; (ii) by defending the possibility of adjustments and variation (in weak/strong terms) in the standard of the assertoric norm, thereby dissolving the idea of uniqueness and indispensability of knowledge as the norm of assertion; and (iii) by addressing what I perceive as a problematic mismatch between what the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA) requires as a standard and the milder epistemic patterns, which are within reach of the assertion speaker, often. At this point, one problem for KNA advocates would be to explain the various cases where KNA violation is not the result of free choice on the part of those making the assertion. It is undeniable that in many cases we do not want and have no choice to assert without knowing, that is, to violate the KNA. The possibility of being able to choose to violate or not a norm (at least in most cases where there is a violation) is precisely the reason for the existence of the norm itself. Finally, I propose that an epistemically responsible agency is sufficient for an appropriate assertion and that the notions of epistemic responsibility and epistemic blame give more meaning to the epistemic norms of assertion.

The object of this thesis is the problem of structural epistemic injustice. This is a problem of social epistemology, approached from the perspective of the concept of hermeneutic injustice developed by Miranda Fricker. In addition, I use genealogical research as a method for investigating this problem. A genealogy can have fictional or factual characteristics, or both. In my work, I have adopted the last option mentioned. Because of this methodological choice, I turned to thinkers such as Nietzsche, Craig, Williams, Fricker and Mills as important philosophical references in the field of genealogical research in philosophy. Using this method, I intend to trace the philosophical path that led to the disappearance of the subject of "epistemic injustice", leading us to what has come to be called "structural injustice". Since "structural injustice" would be an injustice without a subject, I try to identify who the "subject" of such injustice is. To reach the origin of such a subject, I turn to the concept of hermeneutic injustice, because the notion of "structural injustice", for me, is a hermeneutically empty notion, generating a hermeneutic problem that needs to be remedied, either by dissolving the notion as an empty concept, or by filling the conceptual gap with an adequate term (subject), so that there would be no injustice without a subject, and then accountability for the practically of "structural injustice" would be possible. Last but not least, I was able to establish a close relationship between the genealogical method and analytic philosophy, showing an origin of the genealogical method prior to Nietzsche in David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, where Hume gives a genealogy on the concept of "justice as an artificial virtue". This investigative movement also led me to formulate a critique of the tradition of contractualist philosophy, since, it seems, it was from there that the subject of epistemic injustice disappeared in Modernity.

This thesis' aim is to analyze whether the sense of intuition can be expanded when comparing Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as expressed in his Logical Investigations (1900-1901), with Kant's transcendental metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). The general hypothesis of this study suggests that both Kant and Husserl favor the defense of the sense of intuition reduced to the categorial sphere, making it necessary to enlarge the analysis of the sense to defend it as an independent and original structure of knowledge. In Kantian transcendental metaphysics, the a priori structure of understanding subsumes the sense expressed in empirical intuition, considering it to possess an intrinsic epistemic blindness. Although this intuition is responsible for granting sense to the concepts of understanding, the transcendent signification produced by the categories hides the original sense. Conversely, by removing the exclusivity of being from the copula of the judgment and demonstrating that the intensity of the fulfillment of categorial acts depends on the contents of sensible intuition, Husserl attributes categorial aspects to intuition, thus expanding the notion of sense. Following this Husserlian conceptualization, in History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (1925), Heidegger argues that the relational state of true-being and identical-being are a priori laws that subsist in themselves. This definition gains greater emphasis when we realize that it was already present, albeit in an incipient form, in Reinach's Concerning Phenomenology (1914), where he argues for the subsistence of the a priori. Thus, it becomes possible to defend greater autonomy of the sense of intuition concerning the categorial sphere, when grounded in the realist a priori theory of the laws of essence, developed by the early Göttingen phenomenologists.

The present work is determined as a dialogue between philosophy and literature through the articulation of the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and the mature work of Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), with a view to exploring the visible relations from which it’s possible to support the thesis that the philosophy of one and the literature of the other illuminate each other mutually and even present an aspect of complementarity. In this attempt to interpret the extent to which the Dostoyevskian literary world is expressed in Schopenhauerian terms, the notions of reason, suffering and morality are placed in a central position. In concept and image, the ideal of a teleological history is doubly refused, bringing rationality back to the encounter with finitude. It’s the return to the problem of suffering, which doesn’t concern a stage to be overcome dialectically by the political and moral progress of humanity, but the constitutive dimension of the human being. It means to appreciate him according to his abysses: in the irrationality of his will, in the evil positively established by his colossal selfishness inscribed in the heart of a muted nature; but, also in the miracle of goodness which constitutes itself as moral action, founded on the feeling of compassion to express the intuition of the gratuitousness of universal pain. I propose the interpretation that these authors make up a dialogic field that represents a response to the ethical-existential problems arising from the optimism of rationalism and scientific positivism at that time. It isn’t, therefore, purported to affirm a relationship of influence, whose presupposition is the existence of a philosopher Dostoyevsky who makes his literature the instrument of realization of a hidden philosophy indebted to Schopenhauer’s work. Or that it is intended to be, before, signal that the images produced by the mature prose of the Muscovite writer lead to conceptually elaborated contents by the author of The World as Will and Representation, illuminating them not by a simple and remarkable coincidence, but by the fact that both take of a same malaise.

In this work we propose to discuss the Foucauldian hypothesis linking psychoanalytic knowledge and Freud's discourse on sexuality as part of a historical deployment: the deployment of sexuality. To support and sustain our argument, we sought to analyze some of the propositions within the theory of psychoanalytic sexuality, aligning them with Foucault's concept of strategic power-knowledge ensembles, which, by definition constitute the deployment of sexuality. Our research delved into the examination of the notion of the deployment of sexuality. In broad terms, Foucault conceives the notion of sexuality as the productive interactions between power and knowledge relations. According to Foucault, as a result of these power-knowledge interactions, there arise the ensembles of pedagogization, hysterization, psychiatrization, and socialization ensembles, which respectively focus on the child, the woman, the perverse adult, and the reproductive couple. By following the Foucauldian argument, we sought, through these power-knowledge ensembles, to indicate some aspects that allow for a problematization of the discourse on sexuality present in Freudian theory, relating it to the deployment of sexuality. In this context, this research aimed to highlight the possible convergences and divergences between the two theories, particularly in their treatment of infantile sexuality, hysteria, perversions, and procreation. On the one hand, these themes form the basis of the operations of the strategic power-knowledge ensembles, while on the other, they also constitute part of the psychoanalytic theoretical framework. It was necessary, therefore, to investigate what these power-knowledge ensembles entail, as per Foucault, while simultaneously examining the specificities of Freud's approach.

This research inquires the genesis of Friedrich Engels' dialectical conception of nature. Exposed, in its general lines, in works such as the unfinished Dialectics of nature (1873-1882), the Anti-Dühring (1876-1878) and Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy (1886-1888), it was formulated in the late 1850s and matured over the course of the 1860s, in constant contact with the natural sciences and philosophies of his time. The research follows the main moments of the genesis and development of this conception and the theoretical and ideopolitical context of each one of these moments. In the Introduction, we make methodological considerations, justify the scope and object of the research and present an overview of the issues surrounding Engels' dialectic of nature. In chapter 1, The insight of a dialectic of nature, we look into: 1) Engels' finding that new scientific discoveries attested to the occurrence of dialectical phenomena in nature; 2) his description to Marx, in his letter of July 14, 1858, of these phenomena – the documentary mark of the then nascent dialectical conception; and 3) the philosophical repercussions of such a finding, especially the outlines of a theoretical program that, even if it did not materialize at that moment in a proper writing project, would direct his subsequent scientific and natural-philosophical studies towards the foundation of a materialistic natural dialectic. Finally, in chapter 2, The “natural-historical basis for our views”: the Engelsian reception of Darwin's work, we follow, from the impact that the theory of evolution of species had on Engels' thought, the development of his dialectical conception throughout the 1860s, until its culmination, in a letter to Marx of May 30, 1873, in a project to write a Dialectics of nature.

This work aims to examine the human individuality involved in the phenomenon of suicide from the perspective of Karl Marx. Many interpreters conceive the essay On Suicide (2006) as an untimely text by Marx. However, it seeks to problematize that it is not a writing that presents disagreement with the whole of this philosopher's work, starting, among other aspects, with the literary style used. Furthermore, there are also epigones who strive to produce the image of an economistic Marx, who would have dissolved human subjectivity in strictly economic processes. In contrast to these readings, it is intended to demonstrate the philosopher's heuristic concern about human individuality and its implication in the phenomenon of suicide, based on the debate on alienation, detachment, patriarchy and loneliness

The approach about the concepts of redistribution and recognition, by philosopher Nancy
Fraser, exposes the democratic challenge of critical theory to break with the profile of
explaining the functioning of capitalist society and its social problems through hermetic and
monolithic perspectives of social theories. Within this framework, the thinker develops a
conceptual model capable of absorbing both the structures of social domination and the social
resources necessary for its practical overcoming. To this end, she defends a two-dimensional
conception of justice as participatory parity, articulating redistribution and recognition, based
on the Habermasian paradigm of the theory of communicative action and on Honneth's theory
of recognition. Fraser undertakes to reflect on the normative dynamics of objective and
intersubjective relations, considering the feasibility of connecting critique and crisis and social
struggle, using the feminist struggle and the point of view of feminist critical theory as an
empirical reference. In this paper, we investigate how Fraser assumes the concepts of
redistribution and recognition, Fraser’s concept of popular paradigms of justice, the problem of
false antithesis, the model of recognition as status and the participatory parity paradigm. We
analyze the critiques to the two-dimensional project of justice, considering her debates with
Axel Honneth and Iris Young, about the perspective dualism, and with Rainer Forster, about
the participatory parity.

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the possibility of altruistic suicide being a virtuous action from the point of view of Schopenhauerian philosophy. The philosopher considers suicide to be senseless and affirms that it is an action of affirmation of the Will. If the human being has the tendency to affirm the Will in a egocentric and purely individual way, his original attitudes are selfish. In view that Schopenhauer considers only the ascetic suicide (by inanition) as the only way to choose death, indeed, with any moral value, because it is the denial of the Will itself, the research aims to achieve answers to some questions, such as: would it be immoral the case in which, by an act of pure compassion and altruism, someone would choose to die for the survival of another person? The philosopher, in On the basis of morality, proposes that deeds of compassion are the only basis for a moral attitude. Compassion (as well as asceticism), is the negation of one's voracious will, therefore, it is essentially moral. Can it be that one who sacrifices his own life for someone else is acting compassionately?

The present dissertation aims to approach the concept of personhood according to Wilfrid S. Sellars’s synoptic project of unification of the manifest and scientific images of the person-in-the-world. Our approach is particularly informed by the kantian themes present in Sellars’s work. We first approach the concept of knowledge and Sellars’s classical critique of the “myth of the Given”, to defend a theory of knowledge under a practical conception, thus leading us to confront the problem of the relation between mind and world in relation to this practice. Such problem leads us to the conflict between the manifest and scientific images of the person-in-the-world, as images which highlight respectively the normative and descriptive aspects of personhood. We thus propose a unified image by means of a reinterpretation of Kant’s principle of unity of apperception, to the principle of practical unity of personhood, concluding with a formulation of the concept of a person as that of a complex physical system which realizes irreducible logical subjects.

The aim of this work is to investigate the Stoic concept of  pathos  in Zenoand  Chrysippus. We  will  work  with these  two  authors  because  they  pro-vided a basis for the concept of pathos used by later Stoic philosophers, inaddition to a change in conceptual route. For this purpose, we will use assources  the  fragments  of  the  old Stoics,  found  in  the  Stoicorum VeterumFragmenta.

The objective of the present thesis is to analyze the reasons why time is commonly interpreted as movement in everyday life. To do so, we will turn to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, for whom time is what gives meaning to human life. In this way, time is indelibly correlated with life, as it is in the common discourse about daily experiences that time as movement becomes transparent as that which passes, is irreversible, continuous, and unlimited. Analyzing time from the heideggerian perspective also involves delving into Aristotle's thoughts on time; for this philosopher, everyday time is a flow of continuous “nows”, where the current “nows” is interconnected with subsequent and preceding “nows”. In this sense, the “nows” are stretched between the “then”, the posterior, and the “before”, the anterior. Heidegger sees Aristotle's concept of time as the time expressed in everyday life. Through the interconnection of life, time, and movement, we aim to analyze the correlation between the dynamics of life and its relationship with everyday time as movement, in order to reach the original foundations of this mode of time.

This dissertation addresses the communal identity as an object of the generative method. Before dealing with the primary objective of the research, the dissertation clarifies some relevant points. First, it demystifies intersubjectivity as a theme of Husserlian phenomenology through the analyses of Husserl's cartesianism. Second, it states the ways Husserl used to describe intersubjectivity. Third, it defines the structure of history as generative synthesis. Once these three objectives wore fulfilled, it is possible to refer to the community that has an identity as an intersubjective form, which is necessarily social-historical nature and needs to be studied in accordance with its constitution.  The community that has an identity phenomenologically inquired has its genesis investigated. It appears as social-historical genesis established throughout generations. These generations are described as working together to preserve and transform the heritage they receive as being part of a community.

The categorical imperative is the central idea formulated by Kant in order
to analyze what motivates human action and understand both morals and ethics. How
an individual acts on the basis of principles he would like to see applied is the maxim
and could become what Kant calls universal law. Acting based on duty (in this case,
based solely on the supreme principle of morality) goes beyond the concept of doing
what you would like to be done, since your attitude must be free of any interest and
always have an end in itself. same. It is above moral relativism in which what is correct
depends on the situation and context in which the subject finds itself, being beyond
subjectivity, as it can be applied to everyone. At its core is “doing what I would like
everyone to do with everyone”, assuming that your actions will be right if they can
become a universal law followed by the collectivity. Kant's categorical imperative is
based on statements that complement each other, guiding the way in which morally
correct conduct is analyzed: 1. "Act as if the maxim of your action should become,
through your will, a universal law”. 2. “Act in such a way that you use humanity both in
yourself and in the person of anyone else, always and at the same time, as an end and
never as a means”. 3. "Act in such a way that your will can face itself, at the same time
as a universal legislator through maxims." Taking these statements as a starting point,
the categorical imperative is understood as a moral duty that must absolutely reach
everyone. Such a precept is the end in itself and cannot have external justification. Its
objective is to escape the subjective aspects of utilitarianism and understand that the
moral value of actions is closely linked to the agent's motivation and not to the
consequences of any rational agent's act. An action will be morally correct if the
motivation for the agent's conduct is free from any internal or external interest. Thus,
the morally correct act can be analyzed by the procedure of establishing the maxim to
be evaluated (the Principle of Action) and presupposing the transformation of this
maxim into universal law, verifying the consequences of its universalization and
ascertaining whether the moral agent would accept the consequences of transforming
their conduct into a universal law followed by all. Thus, the categorical imperative ends
up valuing the intrinsic value of conduct, the fulfillment of duty driven only by the correct
decision to be taken impartially and disinterestedly respecting the value and humanity
of each rational being and acting according to maxims that everyone could embrace
and practice. The idea of the reason that determines the imperative as it is is about
Freedom. For Kant, freedom is the autonomy to fulfill one's duty in accordance with the
Laws of Nature. “By “moral freedom” must be understood, according to Kant, the
faculty of adaptation to the laws that our reason gives to ourselves; by “juridical
freedom”, the faculty of acting according to the external world, not being impeded by
the equal freedom of other human beings, free like me, internally and externally”.
These are two important concepts that govern the Kantian theory of morality. The
objective of this work is to analyze these concepts, their relationships and their
implications, with a special focus on the books Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason.

The core of our research is, strictly speaking, the issue of hegemony in the Andean world. The approach we have chosen to address this theoretical-political problem is not based on the analysis of this category from a firmly philological point of view nor have we chosen to draw a frame of modulations, uses and potentialities of the notion of hegemony, but we have drawn a political contour — understood as equivalent to the different historical efforts to build hegemony relations — in two countries strongly marked by the Hispanic colonial heritage: Bolivia and Peru. Therefore, our research is not only focused on the history and politics in those nations, but it does so by deploying, as the backbone of the narration, a critical dialogue with the historical approaches and political proposals that emerge from the intellectual production of two of the most important Latin American Marxists of the twentieth century: the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui and the Bolivian René Zavaleta Mercado. The approach to the question of hegemony in the Andean world required questioning the effectiveness of the colonial heritage. Actually, to establish the framework of the hegemony issue, was required a prior genealogical explanation that would account for the motley condition [abigarramiento] on which any political project had to be based in the Andean region. Consequently, we could say that what René Zavaleta Mercado categorized as motley society [formación social abigarrada] and which in a schematic way we could characterize as the disarticulated coexistence of different modes of production, ideological patterns, domination structures and, in short, the simultaneity of temporalities out of sync in the same economic, political, and social scenario, decisively marked the various political projects in the region. Simultaneously, the motley condition —in the particular case that concerns us, the Andean world— could not be understood but as the result of the successive agreements and disagreements between uneven human groups: since the expansion of the Inca Empire, followed by the Conquest and the erection of the Viceroyalty of Peru, interceded by the expansion of commercial capitalism, the Latin American independence processes, the consolidation of the national oligarchies, the irruption of the capitalist mode of production in regional enclaves and so many other factors to which this research dedicates its pages. Ultimately, the motley condition does not refer exclusively to centrifugal tendencies, but also to those centripetal tendencies of attraction to the centers of power (economic, political, religious, etc.): the unresolved tensions between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies illustrate what is at stake with the notion of motley society. The crossroad is evident: if the motley condition indicates the tendency to the disarticulation of the different and, consequently, deepens the separation between the parties; hegemony, on the other hand, consists basically in the construction of a unity between the ruler and the ruled. Thus, as the 16 motley condition is constituted by the tension between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies that determine the normal functioning of power relations, between the separatist ratification of difference and the integrationist drive represented by identity, in the hegemony is also perceptible the tension that configures the metonymic link between the part and the whole, inseparable conflict of all political construction with hegemonic aspirations. These tensions between the notions of motley society and hegemony will appear again and again throughout our research and not only from a theoretical prism centered on the description of the elements that make up the semantic field of these categories, but also —and fundamentally— from the analysis of the historical ambiguities and the strategic instability of the political commitment of an Andean Marxism that finds in the works of Mariátegui and Zavaleta Mercado its most accomplished formulation

This thesis aims to problematize the proposal of overcoming metaphysics presented by Heidegger and, with it, the place of his thought in the stage in which Western philosophy reaches its extreme possibility. Some critics argue that his question of being inaugurates a new mode of unveiling in the history of Western thought. And, therefore, they consider him either as a philosopher of the end of metaphysics, or as responsible for the emergence of a post-modern and post-humanist thought. We will see throughout this thesis that, despite such interpretations, Heidegger does not understand the possibility of overcoming metaphysics as a closure of the preceding history. But as a recognition of the unveiling of being as a condition for the historicity from which metaphysics unfolded and in which we are situated. With that, we will see that he is not consistent with his philosophy to think of it as an effort to break with this tradition, nor to think of the possibility of an epochal transition as an effort of an individual will. Such an overcoming depends on the dispositions of the being's own history.

The  path  to  a  possible  reflection  on  a  struggle  for  recognition  in  Sartre  was,  for  us,  from the  human  body  in  the  sartrian  perspective.  However,  before,  we  provide  some  Sartrian concepts;  we  go  through  the  issue  of  conflict  -  objectifying  or  being  objectified  through the  eyes  of  the  other;  we  approach  Hegelian  thinking  based  on  Sartrian  reading  and carry  out  a  brief  analysis  between  Sartre  and  Hegel  with  regard  to  the  recognition  of  the other.  Furthermore,  this  research  required  us  to  make  distinctions  between  the  concepts of  recognitions,  which  are  present  in  both  Sartre  and  Hegel,  leading  us  to  analyze  the ontological  recognition  in  Sartre  as  critical  to  the  gnosiological  recognition  and,  finally, the  place  of  the  body.  The  body,  at  a  given  moment,  became  relevant,  since  this  whole examination  would  be  abstract  if  it  were  not  present.  Then,  we  investigate  how  the  body is  present  in  intersubjectivity,  understanding  that  it  offers  concreteness  for  the  struggle for  recognition  that,  here,  came  from  consciousness  in  Hegel,  passing  through consciousness  in  Sartre  and  ―ending‖  in  the  sartrian  body.  Thus,  we  conclude  that Sartre's  philosophy  allows  a  discussion  about  the  struggle  for  recognition,  a  discussion that  is  very  current  in  the  philosophical  sphere.  Sartrian  thought  observes  the circumspection  of  the  body,  which  expresses  concreteness  in  intersubjective relationships:  without  the body, there  is no  recognition of the  other.

This research aims to define and dimension the idea of transfiguration in Emil Cioran's Romanian work, with the more specific objective of elucidating the ways that this thought explores the movement to overcome skepticism as a psychological state, without, however, disqualifying it as a theory of knowledge. For this purpose, we have structured the path of our investigation based on two fundamental questions: (i) What is the cioranian conception of skepticism? (ii) What is the concept of transfiguration? By defining them, we can conclude that transfiguration is a proposal to overcome skepticism, that is, a methodological anti-skepticism.

The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the role of moral feelings in the theory of justice as equity as proposed by the philosopher John Rawls. In Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls introduces the idea that moral feelings are important to guarantee social stability in well-ordered societies. In Political liberalism, Rawls reviews some points of the theory of justice as equity, however, he remains firm in his main ideas. It is possible to see a considerable advance between A theory of justice and Political liberalism, since in political liberalism Rawls defends a political conception of justice without refers to current moral conceptions in society. The sense of justice in political liberalism is presented as a social virtue indispensable to achieve a superimposed consensus. Moreover, the sense of justice remains linked to the issue of social stability. The role of the sense of justice in both works is mediate possible conflicts and disagreements inherent to all democratic social system. Thus, this research analyzes how moral feelings, as the sense of justice, can intermediate the conflict of interests between individuals and groups in contemporary democratic societies.

In the present research I propose the analysis of an occasion of reception of Aristotle's Physics in the 13th century, the opuscle De tempore written by Pseudo Thomas Aquinas. I treat the De tempore as a special case of reception of Aristotelian physics, whose content corresponds to the discussion presented by the philosopher in book IV of the work. For its analysis, first, it is discussed how the De tempore stands out in relation to the tradition of commentaries on the Physics and other forms of presentation of the concept of time, this includes its authorship, structure and development of concepts. Secondly, the Commentary on the Sentences of Thomas Aquinas is considered, with incursions on the Commentary on Physics by Averroes, signaling aspects present in the Thomistic theory of time that later figure in his Commentary on Physics, and, consequently, in the De tempore. Finally, I deal with the discussion present in Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on Physics, and its development in the first chapter of the De tempore, which concerns the existence of time outside the soul. That said, I analyze the De tempore by Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, especially the relationship between time and soul, in the context of the reception of Aristotle's Physics by th the scholasticism, as well as its relationship with the texts that would have originated the opuscle, the commentaries on Physics by Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great and Averroes.

The result of a study on the concept of natural law in Thomas Aquinas was on the analysis of the so-called Treatise on Law of Summa Theologica I-II pars. From the moral and epistemological conception of a set of laws the task was undertaken to demonstrate the political character that the concept of natural law incures through the transit of human nature from its state of sociability to that of politicity. In fact, natural law transits from the social sphere, in which it acts as a moral rule conducting human action, to acting as a political rule in the sphere of dominium in civitas, as part of the legal structure composed on human law, justice and the different types of rights. In a preliminary way, this investigation has inferred the analysis of some moments and authors of the history of philosophy, such as, Aristotle, Augustine and Cicero, who were characterized as keys to reading not only the concept of natural law, but the moral and political theory of Thomas Aquinas. 

This thesis inquires about the problem of rational disagreement between epistemic peers. Recently, there is much discussion in epistemology on what would be our epistemic duty in peer disagreements. In others words, the philosophy wants to know what is the rule, the norm, or the rational attitude we should follow in contexts of disagreement. About this question, many pieces of literature arose and several theoretical positions consolidate as an alternative to this problem. For many authors, called conciliationists, disagreement works as a kind of epistemic defeater, for this reason, both parts should re-evaluate their own belief and give equal weight to the opposite belief. Other authors, however, defend a kind of non-conciliationism, for this perspective, we can be steadfast and we can ignore the opponent, the disagreement does not defeat the previous justification we have for the belief. Besides these extreme positions, lately are appearing in the debate many intermediate positions. Furthermore, many problems and objections are directed to each part involved in this debate. The first three chapters of the thesis bring a general discussion on this debate, in these chapters I discuss the main positions – their arguments and their problems. In the fourth and last chapter, I defend a personal position, this one says that in face of a peer disagreement we should have a conciliationist attitude of intellectual humility. This intellectual attitude is conciliationist because understanding that a disagreement with an epistemic peer can affect our own belief, then we should revise our own justification and consider the opposite belief. It is intellectually humble because makes us to recognize our own intellectual limitations. Different from others conciliationist positions, this attitude of humility is not exactly a universal principle, it is more precisely a kind of disposition or intellectual posture. Thus, the conciliationist attitude of intellectual humility in face of peer disagreement could deal better with some objections that affect traditional conciliationism.

Keywords: Disagreement. Epistemic Peers. Intellectual Humility.

Sartre approaches intersubjectivity, in his work Being and Nothingness (1943/2014), taking into
consideration the perspective that man, described by him as human reality, relates to other men in a
fundamentally conflictive way. We opt, following Sartre himself, to use in the Dissertation the term
“human reality” in most of the times that we refer to man.2 Other times, depending on the context, we
use the terms subject, subjectivity, being-for-itself (ontologically) or conscience, but each of the terms
will be placed in due time and fully related to the context mentioned in the topic or chapter in which it
will be approached. That said, as it appears, the conflictive way we talked about above, a result of the
encounter between human realities, concentrates in the manner we encounter, fundamentally, the
other, as constitutive of our being-in-the-world, and in the fact that this constitution reflects itself on
the concrete world of our actions. This would imply, in any case, in the encounter between freedoms,
in a constant process of transcendence of their original situations. The radicality of freedom would be
in the core of the conflict. The question about how each human reality exists in the world, in the
presence of the other, and how Sartre explains this constant tension, that follows the encounter, must
accompany us as a guiding thread in the process of writing this Dissertation, since we strive to
understand if this tension, in human relations, for Sartre, means isolation and dehumanization. We
consider, first, that, Sartre addresses, above all, man as being-in-the-world, conscience understood as
freedom; second, the encounter with the other as contingent; third, human actions as free and,
consequently, as responsible, therefore ethical; and, fourth, that it is based on overcoming, that is, of
transcendence of these contingencies, that it can be expected the accomplishment of humanism, as
Sartre defends in Existencialism is a Humanism (1946/2010), his most famous lecture. In the final
considerations, we will have a dialog with Franklin Leopoldo e Silva, presenting his analysis of the
sartrean humanism, described by him as hard humanism.

The object of study of this dissertation goes through the notion of body in the genealogy of
subjectivity by Michel Foucault in three distinct moments in the light of the so-called
Foucaultian ethical phase: (i) the development of dietetics arts in relation to the body in
classical antiquity; (ii) the practices and procedures, which emerged at the height of the
“culture of the self” in the Hellenistic-Roman period, through which it was possible, under the
sign of self-care, to increase attention in relation to the body; and finally, (iii) ascetic practices
(askesis) as a mechanism for assimilation and incorporation of true discourses. For this, we
use the Foucaultian analyzes regarding the moral and medical knowledge of Antiquity as a
support for the development of the processes of subjectivation.

The present work aims to analyze in an initial way the interpretative debate about the relationship between concept and object in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The emphasis of the debate is on the interpretative opposition between Direct Realism and Representationalism, with regard to the notion of similarity. Thomas presents the concept as a similarity through which we know the external object. Realistic interpretation understands that the term similarity should be read as a relationship of formal identity, between concept and object. Representationalism interprets the concept as a similarity, in the sense that the concept is a mental representation of the essence of the external object. To reach this debate, we have developed an epistemological path that aims to demonstrate, as Thomas knows, the human being. Initially we define what it means to know for Thomas, from there we present the double way in which the human being apprehends the external world. First we engage in sensible apprehension through the senses. Subsequently the intelligible apprehension of bodies, which results in the formation of the concept in the intellect. Only after the conceptual formation in the intellect can we analyze the interpretative debate about the formal relationship between concept and object.

This thesis has as its theme the roots of institutionality. It makes a question about which philosophical ideas allow us to think about human willingness to create and conserve institutions, and it goes in two fronts. First, it consists in a presentation of a binary typology of philosophical ideas about the subject. Each conceived type composes an institutionalist position that concerns a central problem. Inmanential institutionalism, which has authors as G.W.F. Hegel, Arnold Ghlen and Émile Durkheim, deals with the challenge of deinstitutionalization: imminent danger to dissolution that attacks the link and the institutional durability. It sustains that the roots of institutionality are on the reason effectuate in customs, on the ethos of reciprocity or at the social solidarity, ideas that converge to the thesis according to which the main attribute of institutions is stability. Transcendentalist institutionalism, which has authors as Cornelius Castoriadis and Roberto Unger, deals with the problem of hyperinstitutionalization: the threat of current institutional apparatus autonomization. It defends that the roots of institutionality are in the imaginary creator, in historicaççy frozen conflicts or on the normalization of domination, ideas that converge to the thesis according to which institutions can be thought of by its plasticity. The main goal of this front is theming. The second front is the formulation of an theoretical contribution essay that dialogues with these types but which starts from the problem that will be presented as a feature of brazilian institutional experience, that is, semi-institutionalization: the historical trend to make possible a conflictual coexistence between official institutional order and para-institutional order. To deal with this problem one requires identifying the roots of institutionality in the commitment that coming from adherence and in the personhood that projected as material autonomy.

This thesis aims to analyze the concept of epistemic agency, that is, the role of the cognitive agent in the achievement of epistemic goals. The epistemic agency is one of the central topics of discussion in contemporary epistemology, being an essential element for the foundation of Ernest Sosa's Epistemology of Virtues, which understands human cognitive performances as intellectual virtues. The development, in recent decades, of research in the field of Cognitive Psychology, has supported the arguments of naturalistic philosophers who challenge the image of the epistemic agent as defended by Sosa and point to the impossibility of having an agency related to the processes of belief formation. Taking this context into account, I submit the main statements defended by Sosa in his epistemological project to the counter arguments offered by naturalist philosophers such as Hillary Kornblith and Joëlle Proust, reaching the conclusion that the picture sketched by Sosa for the epistemic agency lacks empirical plausibility and therefore, it does not offer an adequate response to the role of the cognitive agent in satisfying epistemic goals. Then, based on Proust's conceptions about the structure of mental actions, I present a model of epistemic agency that seeks to attend both the normative project of epistemology and naturalistic intuitions about human cognitive functioning. The acceptance to this perspective on epistemic agency leads to a more realistic view of the epistemic role of human agents and to an understanding of epistemic normativity aimed at epistemic-motivational purposes.

This research investigates the notion of appropriation in relation to modernity, based on philosophy. The fundamental thesis I seek is that, taking appropriation as the structuring of the dialectic that guided the philosophical discourse of modernity, we can offer a version of appropriation as devouration that can be supported philosophically as a perspective of modernity in its transformative and affirmative character. There is an existential sense of appropriation in post-Hegelian philosophy posed by Max Stirner, as well as an important role of the notion of appropriation in Karl Marx's transformative materialist philosophy – both starting from the Hegelian dialectic, where the concept of appropriation is inserted. Taking modernity as the time of ruptures and changes, of technical protagonism, of the autonomy of the individual and the rise of democracies, the philosophy that wants to apprehend its time and context as a matter for reflection – that is, (post) Hegelian philosophy, a transformation philosophy – will guide you as perspectives of that time. This gives rise to attitudes towards modernity: rejection or fulfillment, affirmation or denial. In the peripheral context of modernity, also starting from the Hegelian influence, Oswald de Andrade develops the suggestion of anthropophagy as a worldview. Here the transformative sense of dialectics and modernity is radicalized in a positive, anti-colonial, exuberant operation, both in an existential dimension and in an offer from a global perspective. I believe that this orientation of dialectic not explored in philosophy (that of anthropophagy) is also a path to modernity. Its limits and advantages is what this research finally wants to point out, in the form of a philosophical narrative that starts from the establishment of the philosophical discourse of modernity to what I will call a dialectic of devouring, a practical-creative anthropophagy.

ABSTRACT

The present dissertation has as main objective to investigate the concept of work of art proposed by Arthur Coleman Danto with the purpose of verifying its capacity to differentiate the mere things of works of art. The research will analyze, in parts, each one of the constituent elements of the concept of work of art presented by Danto and its consequent applications with the objective of differentiating works of art from mere things. As is known, Danto develops his reflections on contemporary art under the impact of the productions of some American pop art artists. This work intends to investigate the conception of work of art proposed by Danto, in view of the successive formulations of his theories and some criticisms that were made to him. Although Danto's philosophical approach to art overcomes the task of definition, I will limit the scope of this research to the definition of his concept of art and to some notions he has presented and which have somehow become well known in the contemporary discussion of difference between "works of art" and "mere real things".

This research proposes to analyze in Foucault's thought two possible conceptions of freedom. On the one hand, politics (genealogical axis) that, through governmentality, the strategic field of power relations, implies mutual relations that make room for resistance; on the other hand, ethical freedom (ethical axis – subjective), which is presented in the examination made of the practice of freedom in late stoicism, from self-care, through regular exercises that allow the individual to to live life as art, since ethics, as a reflected practice, is also an exercise of freedom. Indeed, ethics as a practice of freedom, as something that transforms the world and oneself, occurs in the encounter with the other, far from being an solitary with the self, is realized in association with others. In this way, we will try relate ethical freedom to politics, showing how the individual practices freedom to from the care of the self, and understand how it is possible to problematize this practice of freedom as a movement of resistance, since when the individual resists the power of the other through self-practices, a variety of possibilities opens up, and this it only occurs because the individual is free. From this perspective, the game existing in the relationships takes place from the government, that is, from the conduction of conducts, and must give way to resistance movements, that is, instead of just understanding the mechanisms of driving or letting oneself be driven, it is necessary to resist it, so that there can be possibility of the development of forms of counter-conducts, which happen as opening to new subjectivities in the field of insubordination, of disobedience.

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze silencing as an epistemological problem. The way it is understood in this work, silencing refers to a communicative phenomenon in which a sender keeps his words to himself instead of enunciating them to his interlocutor. As a linguistic problem, the harmful silence is not that derived from a strategy or deliberation in which the alleged emitter gives way in turn for his interlocutor to pronounce himself, on the contrary, it refers to an imposed silence in which the emitters are coerced not to manifest themselves. With regard to this problem as an epistemological question, the type of communicative act in question are those aimed at transmitting knowledge to other people. From Miranda Fricker's inaugural work, Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of knowing (2007), a fruitful field of investigation was opened in analytical philosophy about how social relations can negatively interfere in the production, maintenance and dissemination of knowledge practices. This work is situated in the field of social epistemology and, therefore, conceives individual and collective agents within the contexts and dynamics of the real world, considering the social structures to which it is subjected - in this sense, moving away from the subject of knowledge taken in abstract by classical epistemology. Based on these considerations, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand the role of testimony in the cognitive life of other people, to analyze the epistemically dysfunctional mechanisms that induce certain individuals and groups to be silenced and, finally, to glimpse possibilities of reverting these processes through virtues and practices that promote epistemic justice, that is, the opening and inclusion of marginalized agents in epistemic practices.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator

This investigation – from the standpoint of present reality and based on Hannah Arendt's philosophical work – looks for the possible relations between the fundamental human activities of action and thinking. The careful analysis of Arendt's work, I wish to argue, be it focused on studying our mental activities or historical events and the phenomenality characteristic of the universe of action, points out the existence of a central axis for understanding what configure the peculiarity of the beings we are. This same axis is what will allow us, considering the proposed, to expose the nature of the relationships between action and thinking while trying to understand our time and the depth of the crisis we are in. Such an axis focuses on the Arendtian notion of freedom, and this notion comes to light through the hypothesis that human freedom, the central factor of our humanity, is a cyclical political exercise to which converge mutually, in harmonic tension, the activities of acting and thinking. In order to corroborate this hypothesis, are investigated, in a transversal way across the text, three dimensions of human existence taken as constitutive of the understanding of freedom here at stake: a) the metaphorical discursive language we are capable of, b) the singular personality we perform in the world and c) our faculty of reflective judgment.

ARAÚJO, Rodrigo Oliveira. The question of writing in the work of Walter Benjamin. Doctoral thesis. Graduate Program in Philosophy. Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2018.

Walter Benjamin has found that the issue of presentation (Darstellung) has historically proven to be a problem immanent to philosophical doing in itself. The present work aims to understand how he confronted this problem in the scope of his philosophical writing. The thesis deals with this theme through three perspectives that it considers structuring in the author's work: the way in which he understood language and place of writing in this process of understanding; the place of writing in his epistemological critique, as well as in his presentation of the aesthetic concept of allegory; and, finally, the theme of philosophical writing in its connection with politics. The discussion on this connection is based on the relationship that Benjamin established with the literary experiments present in the historical vanguards of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through his own remarkably experimental writing. The thesis intends, therefore, to offer a detailed examination of Benjamin's conceptualization of the subject of writing in philosophy, and of the way in which he faced the question by shifting, experimenting, and exercising in various ways his own activity as a writer of a very peculiar philosophy.

The philosophy of David Hume has as one of its characteristics the fact of unifying what was traditionally thought to belong to the scope of necessity and that which belonged to the realm of freedom. Hume thinks of Nature as a unity, and although his works have internal divisions that distinguish the matters between which is relative to the understanding, which is relative to the passions and which is relative to the morals, what we perceive is that these divisions only serve to show that the scope of disciplines can be integrated under the same approach, under the same explanatory principle, just as Newton unified heavens and Earth under universal gravitation. But his thought was reformulated, and what appeared in the third book on morals in the Treatise of Human Nature is dispersed in his later synthesis in appendices to the Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the principles of Morals and in his Essays Moral, Political and Literary. In these texts we find his reflection on issues such as justice, property, contracts and a series of aspects related to Economics and Politics, understood under the treatment that he dispenses to luxury, refinement, excess and superfluous, as far as he considers them as objects at once of morals and passions. Hume’s moral sentimentalism imposes the consideration of these themes in the key of the consideration between private interest and public interest, the sovereign agency and the good of the Nation, in a reflection in which moral development is not dissociated from material prosperity. Thus, a more precise understanding of these texts promotes not only the opportunity to consider his philosophy as a totality that faces the empirical issues expressed in History, Politics and Economy, but allows us to discern the position of Hume in vivid debates of his time, in a moment when Economics was being formed as a scientific body of knowledge separated from Morals. His peculiar way of understanding human nature allowed him to formulate a series of economic considerations that do not dissociate them from moral reflection, since for Hume the passions are the human motive. Thus understood, his contributions carry the marks that characterize economics to this day: that of being a body of probable knowledge, founded rather on probability than on the certainty of internal laws known in the manner of ultimate causes; and to constitute an amalgam of descriptions and prescriptions, at the same time meant to explain economic phenomena and influence their future courses. Hume’s economic reflection thus provides elements to consider the various theoretical traditions in which contemporary Economics divides today, in as much as it points out that the operation of separation from Morals has not been definitively completed and may not be possible to do so. It poses itself as a possible synthesis; and although limited to some aspects and little served of precise calculation tools to guide political and economic actions, it already offers several elements that have continued to populate the theoretical universe of Economics, as for example the notions of utility, pleasure, excess and the importance of feelings for the explanation of economic phenomena.

The present work starts from the investigation of the statute of the relation between the body and the conscience, demonstrating how the unfolding of this relationship will enable the construction of a horizon of meaning that can be shared, establishing an opening for the intersubjectivity, which, being always inscribed within the scope of sensibility, will enable not only the individual sensible apprehension of reality data, but also the sharing of the senses elaborated through the expressiveness of the body, revealing this last as a true channel of communication. In this sense, we intend to describe the articulation between the biological dimension of the organism, its self-regulation and its unfolding into a model of integration of functions that will structure, in an integral whole and interdependent, motor skills, affectivity, sexuality, and language. This structuring will found the perfectly elaborate mental space that is the hallmark of man, which it will function as the center from which all your expressive endeavors will derive. In As a result of this integration, we will assume intercorporeality as the concrete mode of intersubjectivity, unequivocally establishing the fact that a communication originating from between the individuals operated by the sensitivity pathway. Through this movement it will be possible describe the genesis of meaning from the sensitive intertwining of the individual body, things and others, intertwining this grounding in the spontaneous experience of a world which will unfold in an articulated language - elaborated from the intersubjective elements cataloged by community experience - and its institutions derivatives. Finally, as a result of this itinerary, we intend to support the hypothesis that this spontaneous communication is only possible because we have always been connected with each other through our body so that we find in the incorporeality the dimension of our existence that sustains and from which all our symbolic practices sprout.

The present dissertation aims to offer an analysis of Richard Rorty's interpretation of Freudian theory, with special attention to the absence of the concept of resistance, a problem recognized by the author himself. Interested in Freud's contribution to moral reflection, Rorty elaborates his interpretation by emphasizing the conversational aspect of the psychic instances, thus softening the dimension of conflict present in Freud. Part of Rorty's argumentative strategy is to eliminate the metapsychological explanation, which makes it difficult to attempt a redescription of the concept of resistance compatible with this reading. It remains to be seen what consequences result from the absence of this concept. We argue here that such absence derives from the philosophical choices on which Rorty bases his interpretation. In this way, we try to present Rorty's assumptions regarding philosophy and interpretation. The clarification of the meaning and relevance of the Freudian concept of resistance was also developed to highlight the distinctions between Freud and the interpretation offered. The work is complemented with the support of Roy Schafer, who offers a redescription of the resistance that in our judgment is compatible with the proposal rortyana.

The presence of literature in Marx's writings dates from before his project of critique of political economy, but it is from this that literary art merges with his analyzes in an odd way, especially in "Capital", which it is linked to scientificity and re-signifies it. The analysis of the relationship between literature and the critique of political economy in "Capital" presented some possibilities of understanding literature in Marx's work: a) source of historical research; b) source of social criticism; c) source of analogies and metaphors. However, these possibilities have as main axis the exposition of the contradictions of capitalist society and the incitement to the creation of a new conception of reality distinct and in opposition to the capitalist. The reading of classical authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes and Balzac, mentioned by Marx, was carried out with the aim of seeking to understand how Marx articulated them to his critique of political economy. In order to problematize this question in a adequately way, contemporary authors were appreciated in their works, like Lukács, Kosik, Kundera and Blanchot. The conceptions of these authors, when confronted, brought contributions that broadened the understanding of the ways in which Marx used literature both in the critique of political economy and especially in the heyday of this project: the publication of Capital. The manner in which Marx wrote "Capital," merging science and literature, gave the work a dramatic dimension. "Capital" thus became a drama about bourgeois society.

Interpretivism is a philosophical position that seeks to understand the mental from the third person point of view. The main representatives of this position are Daniel Dennett e Donald Davidson. In order for communication to be possible, a behavioral interpretation needs to take place, which demands the attribution of a number of mental states. In Davidson, one can find the principles of charity and rationality. According to him, one must presuppose a high rate of coincidence between someone´s beliefs and his interlocutor so that they can communicate. In the same direction, Dennett argues that the behavior of particular actors can only be explained and anticipated through the adoption of the Intentional stance, i.e., through the attribution of intentionality. Such attribution is never of isolated beliefs and desires, but of a diffused set of mental states, including a background of beliefs that are mostly true. To these authors, it is not possible to relinquish of a typically intentional vocabulary. The vocabulary of psychology, therefore, cannot be reduced to that of physics. For this reason, interpretivism is considered a form of non-reductive materialism. They advocate that the standpoint of the interpreter takes precedent over subject’s viewpoint in the search for an understanding of the mind. They call for an inversion of the starting-point: research should start from the outside to the inside; otherwise, it becomes barren, imprisoned within the subject. This text aims to present the interpretative headings of those two authors, asking if they are realistic or unrealistic concerning the mind. In this investigation, it is crucial to understand the epistemological role assigned to mental states by supporters of that approach. We claim that, for these authors, the mind have to be understood from the subject’s relations to the world and with others subjects. Dennett finds in the evolutionary history the grounds on which those relations are set. Davidson finds them in the triangulation processes present in any situation of communication. We argue that the existence of mental states cannot be denied if you adopt an interpretivist perspective, even if these mind states are not situated within the subject. The reason is that they have a crucial epistemological role. Without them, one could not give any meaning for someone else’s behavior, much less communicate with others. The ontological power does not stem, here, from them being obvious from a first-person standpoint. The reality of the states of mind, in an interpretivist position, is bound to its usefulness and indispensability. This position has the advantage of being compatible with a scientific take on the mind, because it approaches the mental from a publicly accessible viewpoint. Simultaneously, such a position acknowledges and sustains the role played by common-sense psychology, being neither eliminativist nor reductionist.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the concept of novum institutum, here also called the life forms, in order to highlight the approximation between knowledge and existence in the philosophy of Espinosa. The relation between knowing and existing implies deciding for what is most convenient to potentiate our existence. In this way, from a the life forms marked by distractions (distraithur) to a more potent life form, we will call it a ferry. The hypothesis that guided us is the possibility, based on premisses yielded by the espinosana philosophy, we think about the possibility of a singular way to think about its own existence. That is to say, it becomes, to some extent, aware of the possibility of establishing for itself forms of existence. We understand that from the denaturation of traditional values and the cultivation of desire for a more powerful life Espinosa presents a sophisticated path to increase the autonomy of the individual and the institution of a new form of existence. Our work has as main reference the Tractatus of Intellectus Emendatione (TIE), besides the Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata.