From sensitive apprehension to intelligible knowledge in Thomas Aquinas
Similitude, formal identity, concept, essence
The present work aims to analyze in an initial way the interpretative debate about the relationship between concept and object in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The emphasis of the debate is on the interpretative opposition between Direct Realism and Representationalism, with regard to the notion of similarity. Thomas presents the concept as a similarity through which we know the external object. Realistic interpretation understands that the term similarity should be read as a relationship of formal identity, between concept and object. Representationalism interprets the concept as a similarity, in the sense that the concept is a mental representation of the essence of the external object. To reach this debate, we have developed an epistemological path that aims to demonstrate, as Thomas knows, the human being. Initially we define what it means to know for Thomas, from there we present the double way in which the human being apprehends the external world. First we engage in sensible apprehension through the senses. Subsequently the intelligible apprehension of bodies, which results in the formation of the concept in the intellect. Only after the conceptual formation in the intellect can we analyze the interpretative debate about the formal relationship between concept and object.