Banca de DEFESA: MURILO GARCIA DE MATOS AMARAL

RUSSELL AND THE GRAMMATICS OF A SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

Bertrand Russell; scientific philosophy; philosophical grammar; logical atomism; experience and existence.

This work explores the construction processes of a specific language to philosophy in Bertrand Russell. The aim was to understand how he determined the vocabulary and syntax of the language used in his logical atomism, with attention to the notions of existence and experience. In order to do that, I had to examine how his analysis of propositions and concepts served to this purpose. I have noted that Russell tried to guide these analyses through non-dogmatic precepts, which are align with his idea of a scientific philosophy. I have identified that his analysis of propositions seeks to break with a logic unjustifiably restricted to the subject- predicate form, which he thought to be the origin of a defective grammar and thus cause of superfluous metaphysical problems. Moreover, I have identified that his analysis of concepts always seeks to determine the supposed “most fundamental” meaning of a philosophical notion, understanding that its meaning should consist in “the nucleus” of a word’s multiples usual meanings. Thereby, he hoped to prevent a particular meaning of the word from imposing itself on the others without a reason for it. Taking the analysis of propositions and concepts under that basis, Russell tried to precisely determine the meaning of “experience” and “existence” to compose a grammar free of vagueness and ambiguity, compatible with his scientific philosophy. Regarding to “existence”, Russell defines it as a property of propositional functions. Thus, the proposition “a exists” could be best understood as “‘x is a’ is possible” or “‘x is a’ is sometimes truth”. I argue that the meaning of “existence” is further complemented by the fundamental meaning of “experience”, which can be found in the notion of acquaintance. I pointed out that “existence” and “acquaintance” are defined in symbiosis, so that all that exists in the strict sense of the word is what is known by acquaintance. The thesis structure is divided into three chapters. Chapter

1 introduces logical atomism and shows why Russell takes it as a scientific philosophy. Chapter 2 explains its capital method – which is logical analysis – and provides two examples of analysis of propositions. Finally, Chapter 3 shows how the analysis of propositions and concepts serves to the construction of a philosophical grammar. In addition, an annex brings the translations of two texts, “Le réalisme analytique” and “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, after a commentary on the thesis’ impact on our translation choices.