Banca de DEFESA: BRENO PASCAL DE LACERDA BRITO

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE : BRENO PASCAL DE LACERDA BRITO
DATA : 29/03/2019
HORA: 09:00
LOCAL: Instituto de Física da Universidade Federal da Bahia
TÍTULO:

The Role of Values in Acceptance and Proposal of Theories and Models in Biological Sciences - A Contribution From Epistemology

PALAVRAS-CHAVES:

 Epistemic Value, Non-Epistemic Value, Hugh Lacey, Value Epistemology, Reflexion, Understanding, Scientific Practice.

PÁGINAS: 85
GRANDE ÁREA: Ciências Humanas
ÁREA: Educação
RESUMO:

Biological Sciences have increased in importance over the last decades,
mainly due to an increase in the phenomena that this area proposes to study and the
increase of practices where biological knowledge is necessary. Because of this,
Biology has faced the need to understand the practice of biologists, qua scientists,
especially about the choice of their Theories and Models. In this way, there is an
growing demand in the area about understand what role the values play in this
practice. In this debate, there are two possible positions: the first argues that only
epistemic values should have influence in this practice; and the second argues that
both epistemic and non-epistemic values play a role in the practice of biological
sciences. Between that debate, the second position manages to present a greater
capacity to explain the Biological Sciences practices, without ignoring the questions of

the World of Life, increasingly pertinent to Biological Sciences. Among these models,
we can highlight the RVS model, by Hugh Lacey, who argues that scientific practice
can be understood in logical moments, which accepts different values given the
purpose of each moment. The RVS model has an ability to explain a wide range of
phenomena in Biological Sciences practices and is able to overcome criticism that
other models are not so robust to face. We can highlight among the answer to these
criticisms, for example, the non-confusion of the moments of application and
acceptance of Theories or Models T and how and which values act at these different
moments. Another point is the ability of RVS to articulate explanations for scientific
conduct without being restricted to the use of non-epistemic values, but without any
time discarding the importance of them. However, the SVR, like the other models that
seek to explain the role of values in the sciences, when talking about how the selection
of scientific theories and models occurs, focuses only on the expression of epistemic
values in T. However, this posture cannot be translated into clear criteria of why T was
selected, it is not empirically feasible to compare the expression of values in rival
Theories, either by the lack of a method to say which T has the highest set of values or
how to compare different values with expression different from its degree. In order to
solve this problem, we propose that the question of the selection of T should be
analyzed from the perspective of the Epistemology of Virtues. Thus, we argue that a
good theory or model would be one that was chosen by a Competing Epistemic Agent.
To do so, the Agent must be able to use his reflexive ability to access the reasons that
lead him to accept T and thus be able to articulate them rationally with the epistemic
values of an epistemic community to which he belongs. In this way the virtuous
Epistemic Agent, when performing an suitable performance, will generate a greater
understanding about the phenomenon that T approaches and indicating that it is,
compared to others based on the information that the Agent has access, the best
Theory or Model to be accepted. We further argue that this Agent must act according to
the Principle of Epistemic Precaution in evaluating T because in this way he will be
more zealous of the possible epistemic risks associated with his performance and
being a more critical and responsible agent in his process of acceptance. Therefore,
we propose a review of the RVS model by the focus of the Competent Epistemic
Agent, and which would allow overcome its criticism. This favors a new proposal of
Attitude cognitive, called Reflective Assessment, where the Agent must in evaluating T,
make use of his reflection for better adaptation of T and articulate his reasons
according to the epistemic values of an epistemic community that he is part of, that is
possibly composed of epistemic pairs, that accepts the exchange of values, the debate
and the rational dissent and that favors the publicity of its information. By assuming the
Reflective Attitude, the agent is then able to judge responsibly whether to accept, reject
or suspend the value of T from the evaluation of the best understanding of T. Finally,
we conclude that the use of the concepts and perspectives of Epistemology to address
the problems of the role of values in science has proved quite useful. From this
perspective, it is possible to defend the position of the analysis focus on the Agent
rather than the theory, which changes the perception that we should have of the
possibility of Autonomy and Impartiality for an Autonomy and Epistemic Impartiality.
That is, not ideal, more epistemic values associated with the virtuous Epistemic Agent,
capable of achieving higher value epistemic purposes, since they are more reliable and
of which the Agent can be responsible and defend critically.

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Presidente - 1090422 - CHARBEL NINO EL HANI
Externo à Instituição - EROS MOREIRA DE CARVALHO - UFRGS
Externo à Instituição - FREDERIK MOREIRA DOS SANTOS - UFRB
Externo à Instituição - HUGH MATTHEW LACEY
Interno - 836.185.465-72 - NEI DE FREITAS NUNES NETO - UFGD
Interno - 1082451 - WALDOMIRO JOSE DA SILVA FILHO