The concept of nature in Feuerbach and in the young Marx
Nature. Ludwig Feuerbach. Karl Marx. Essence. Alienation.
This dissertation investigates the concept of nature in the works of Ludwig Feuerbach and the young Karl Marx, aiming to deconstruct the historiographical myth of a linear and uninterrupted continuity between Feuerbach’s naturalism and the foundation of Marxian practical materialism. The central hypothesis maintains that this alleged peaceful transition masks insoluble structural antinomies between the two thinkers. Methodologically, the research adopts an exegetical and historical-critical approach, supported by primary sources and an unprecedented philological effort to translate Feuerbach’s essay Ueber den Anfang der Philosophie (1841) from its original Gothic typography. The argumentative path maps the mutations of the concept of nature from the organic totality of Greek physis to the mechanistic reductionism of modernity, in order to then confront the ontological matrices of both philosophers. It is demonstrated that Feuerbach elevates sensitive and corporeal nature to the condition of an absolute base, retreating, however, to a passive, biological, and contemplative sensualism that empties Hegelian negativity and paralyzes human essence in immediacy. In contrast, the young Marx subverts this matrix by rescuing historical and dialectical negativity: nature is reinscribed within the dynamic metabolism of productive praxis. The study highlights that, for Marx, the generic life is not realized through affective intersubjective contemplation, but through the material transformation of the world, a process violently fractured by alienation under the aegis of private property and capital. The thesis concludes that Marx’s materialism does not act as a direct heir to Feuerbach, but rather consolidates a radical rupture, abandoning organic passivity in favor of the revolutionary historical-practical task of emancipation.