Banca de DEFESA: DAILA ATAÍDE

Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : DAILA ATAÍDE
DATE: 01/07/2026
TIME: 14:00
LOCAL: PPGF-UFBA
TITLE:

Freedom, bad faith and morality in Sartre

KEY WORDS:

Freedom; Bad Faith; Morality; Ontology; Existentialism

PAGES: 161
BIG AREA: Ciências Humanas
AREA: Filosofia
SUMMARY:

Jean-Paul Sartre never published a text specifically on morality; however, his contributions in
Being and Nothingness (1943) allow us to conceive of a moral philosophy grounded in his
ideal of freedom and authenticity. The problem of freedom leads to the problem of morality,
since freedom points to the value of free action. In this sense, the objective is to analyze the
concept of bad faith and to reflect on the possibility of a morality founded on Sartrean
ontology, by considering the modes of being of the in-itself and the for-itself, moving
towards a morality of authenticity. Bad faith hinders the realization of an authentic existence.
It is a device to try to escape freedom, which is the condition of human existence, whereas
authenticity seeks a reflexive consciousness of reality and takes responsibility for the choice
at the moment of action, whatever its consequences. Thus, this work intends to investigate
how bad faith affects our relationships and our ethical sense, seeking to examine to what
extent what he calls authenticity would be possible within Sartre’s thought. Authenticity is
articulated from the philosopher’s conceptions of freedom and responsibility. It emerges to
overcome the consequences of the negative attitudes arising from bad faith. The possibility of
human action can be a project of bad faith, that is, an attempt for the modes of being of the
for-itself and the in-itself to coexist in the same being. To assume an authentic conduct
implies the conscious and reflexive assumption of one’s own freedom and its paradox.
Morality is established in this authentic relationship of the subject with itself, to the point of
not seeking a foundation for the modes of being of the in-itself, nor denying its human reality.
This morality is in accordance with what man is, and he is his own freedom. However, this
freedom rests on the radical contingency of the for-itself being, which means that, even as the
individual seeks a foundation to justify his actions, he also perceives that this foundation can
only be himself.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Presidente - 2335536 - VINICIUS DOS SANTOS
Interno - ***.499.008-** - MALCOM GUIMARÃES RODRIGUES - UEFS
Externa à Instituição - THANA MARA DE SOUZA - UFES