Vutive: an African epistemology
Social epistemology, nature of knowledge, vutive, testimony
In most known languages, the notion of knowledge is associated with the idea of reliable informants (testimony); a relationship between speakers and listeners, or between first and second person. The normativist perspective, the tripartite dimension of knowledge as a standard, avoids many peculiar problems such as those found in other analytical contexts, including the African one. However, the same tripartite definition of knowledge — justified true belief — faces challenges (arguments for and against). Considering the existing critiques of exclusionary epistemic normativism, I demonstrate in this study that the analytical perspective of knowledge is capable of engaging in dialogue with African epistemology. In this way, through this research, I intend to bring new horizons, ways of seeing, and problematizing the nature of knowledge, as well as treating its production as a communal and contextual epistemic good. As the final objective of this study, I seek to examine the epistemic meaning of the notion of knowledge, referred to as vutive. Vutive is one of the notions of knowledge among Bantu peoples, particularly the Tsonga. For the Bantu tradition, vutive as a notion of knowledge means both knowledge and wisdom, with the concept of knowledge intrinsically linked to the idea of a reliable informant — a fact that is partly due to the tradition of transmitting knowledge orally (oraliture), the normativity of our communal epistemic practices, which involve demands for various ethically charged forms of recognition. With this study, I also intend to contribute to contemporary African social epistemology, establishing an analytical comparison — a dialogue between analytic philosophy and African philosophy (or epistemology) — through a conciliatory perspective on knowledge.