RUSTIC SKEPTICISM AND URBAN SKEPTICISM: AN INTERPRETATION OF OSWALDO PORCHAT'S NEO-PYRRHONISM
epokhé; Neo-Pyrrhonism; urbane skepticism; rustic skepticism; Oswaldo Porchat
The present work aims to investigate the concept of suspension of judgment (epokhé) in the context of Neo-Pyrrhonism as formulated by Oswaldo Porchat. In this sense, special attention is given to the debate between rustic and urbane skepticism. The research considers the ancient Pyrrhonian tradition, as presented by Sextus Empiricus, in order to understand how epokhé can be articulated with the philosophical practice known as withholding of assent to face the equipollence of arguments, thus leading to ataraxy (peace of mind). The study analyzes the main phases of Porchat's thought: his initial adherence to hermeneutic structuralism, his temporary refusal of philosophy, his valorization of the common worldview, and, finally, the construction of his own skeptical philosophy. By considering this, it is shown how Porchat shapes Pyrrhonian skepticism into a critical contemporary philosophy, which refuses dogmatism but maintains a commitment to practical and common life. Lastly, this dissertation addresses the contemporary debate between two of Porchat’s readings: the rustic interpretation, which defends the absence of beliefs even in common life; and the urbane interpretation, which concedes that ordinary beliefs can coexist with the suspension of dogmatic philosophical themes. Porchat leans towards the urbane perspective and argues that a skeptic can live according to appearances and social conventions, without compromising their philosophical stance. It is concluded that Porchat's thought offers an original contribution to Brazilian philosophy by proposing a form of skepticism that acknowledges doubt as a rigorous method and the suspension of judgment as a philosophical attitude towards the limits of knowledge.