NIETZSCHE AND THE ETHICS OF AFFECTS: EGOISM AS A CREATIVE POWER OF THE SELF
Nietzsche; Egoism; Will to Power; Ethics of Affects.
This dissertation investigates the concept of egoism in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, proposing its transvaluation as an affirmative principle of self-creation rather than as a moral vice or ethical deviation, as it is traditionally understood by Christian morality and modern philosophy. From a critical analysis of the metaphysics of the subject and of moral doctrines that associate egoism with the negation of the other, it is argued that, in Nietzsche, egoism is an expression of the will to power, that is, of the individual’s capacity to affirm their singularity, interpret affects, and create their own values. By displacing the center of subjectivity from reason to affects, the German philosopher reformulates the foundations of moral evaluation, showing that all valuation is inseparable from an affective dynamic. The theoretical path of the thesis is organized in three moments: the deconstruction of the idea of the subject as a moral substance; the critique of the morality of resentment and compassion as forms of repression of affects; and, finally, the elaboration of an affirmative ethics in which egoism emerges as self-care and a style of existence. Drawing on commentators such as Gilles Deleuze, Gianni Vattimo, Roberto Machado, and Scarlett Marton, the thesis maintains that Nietzschean egoism is a condition for individuation and resistance to the normative regulation of life. It is, therefore, a matter of understanding egoism not as a rejection of ethical life, but as its highest form of affirmation and as a creative power of the self.