Banca de DEFESA: BRUNO TENORIO COELHO

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : BRUNO TENORIO COELHO
DATE: 10/09/2024
TIME: 08:00
LOCAL: Ambiente virtual RPN
TITLE:

Inquiry into the nature of explanatory understanding

KEY WORDS:

understanding, knowledge, explanation, truth

PAGES: 148
BIG AREA: Ciências Humanas
AREA: Filosofia
SUBÁREA: Epistemologia
SUMMARY:

In this text, I discuss the following question: What is understanding? I consider the main arguments in the literature and defend a specific conception of understanding, according to which understanding involves grasping correct explanations. To this end, I initially discuss the relationship between knowledge and understanding. I evaluate in what sense understanding differs or does not differ from knowledge. I assess proposals according to which understanding would be distinct from knowledge, as well as those that characterize understanding as a type of knowledge. Subsequently, I consider the relationship between understanding and explanation. I present some elementary aspects of the concept of explanation, and how it normally involves the apprehension of dependency relations. Subsequently, I present the conception of understanding that I consider most plausible. I maintain that there is understanding when we grasp correct explanations. Next, I evaluate the notion of apprehension. In the literature on understanding, this term appears frequently, usually linked to conscious transparency. I will argue that understanding does not involve conscious transparency or any second-order state. To this end, I present some data in cognitive science that demonstrate the opacity of the mind, that is, that we have very limited access to our mental states, so that cognitive success, expressed in terms of knowledge or understanding, does not involve this conscious transparency. In the last chapter, I discuss the relationship between understanding and truth. I discuss an argument in favor of a non-factive conception of understanding to evaluate the main points on this issue. After characterizing this argument, I argue that several responses are available to the veritist. First, one can defend a non-factive conception of understanding while maintaining compatibility with veritism. Another way to maintain veritism is to admit a more liberal notion of representation. Finally, it can be maintained that only those aspects that make a difference are considered in a correct explanation, thus maintaining the thesis that understanding is a factive notion, that is, it requires truth as a necessary condition. I argue that this last option is the most plausible.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Presidente - 1082451 - WALDOMIRO JOSE DA SILVA FILHO
Interno - ***.725.355-** - FELIPE ROCHA LIMA SANTOS - UFBA
Interno - 1418569 - GIOVANNI ROLLA
Externo à Instituição - ROGÉRIO PASSOS SEVERO - UFRGS
Externa à Instituição - EVELYN FERNANDES ERICKSON - UFSC
Externo à Instituição - JOSÉ LEONARDO ANNUNZIATO RUIVO - UEMA