Self-Knowledge, Skepticism, and Language in the Philosophy of Stanley Cavell
ordinary language; skepticism; self-knowledge; subjectivity.
The connections between Cavell's philosophy of ordinary language (FLO) and the themes of skepticism, the possibility of attributing meaning to language and self-knowledge are ways of thinking about the conditions for expressing situations of the mind (plight of mind) and the circumstances that allow an individual to communicate a specific human condition. In this sense, the most common and natural uses of ordinary language reveal a starting point for claiming the mutual recognition of actions and words, without, however, guaranteeing the intelligible presentation of a subjective voice. In Cavell's FLO, the epistemic status of the wittgensteinian notion of criterion implies a view of the relations between individuals, and between them and the world, based on a critique of the skeptical claim for indubitable knowledge. According to Cavell, these possibilities of bonding depend on an acceptance of the fragile nature of the agreements in judgments that establish the criteria for meaningful uses of language, as well as on an attitude of recognition that seeks an intelligible approximation in relation to the other. Cavell understands skepticism as a repudiation of language that results in tragic consequences due to the death of the capacity for recognition. His approach to modern skepticism establishes a link between his FLO and self-knowledge based on a claim for the recognition of subjective expressions as a way of communicating a specific human condition. In this thesis, I try to approach these themes from interlocutions between Cavell, Kripke, Descartes, Shakespeare and Wittgenstein, in order to suggest FLO as an activity of clarification of the conditions of mutuality, in other words, the conditions for effective intersubjective communication and self-knowledge.