The dispensability of knowledge for appropriate assertion
, knowledge, norm of assertion; epistemic responsibility, epistemic blame
This work aims to argue that the norm of appropriate assertion does not require knowledge as a requirement. To do so, initially, I will attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of a milder assertoric epistemic standard compared to knowledge. This plausibility will be emphasized as follows: (i) by advocating for the possibility of a norm of assertion independent of the doxastic state of belief, showing the existence of appropriate assertion without knowledge, since belief is a prerequisite for knowing; (ii) by defending the possibility of adjustments and variation (in weak/strong terms) in the standard of the assertoric norm, thereby dissolving the idea of uniqueness and indispensability of knowledge as the norm of assertion; and (iii) by addressing what I perceive as a problematic mismatch between what the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA) requires as a standard and the milder epistemic patterns, which are within reach of the assertion speaker, often. At this point, one problem for KNA advocates would be to explain the various cases where KNA violation is not the result of free choice on the part of those making the assertion. It is undeniable that in many cases we do not want and have no choice to assert without knowing, that is, to violate the KNA. The possibility of being able to choose to violate or not a norm (at least in most cases where there is a violation) is precisely the reason for the existence of the norm itself. Finally, I propose that an epistemically responsible agency is sufficient for an appropriate assertion and that the notions of epistemic responsibility and epistemic blame give more meaning to the epistemic norms of assertion.